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Abstract 
An effective mutual fund market in which investors find and choose the funds which best suit their 
needs is beneficial from a societal perspective as it makes the markets more efficient. To bring the 
market closer to this goal, it is therefore important to study how retail investors make mutual fund 
decisions. This thesis provides a qualitative study into how private Finnish stock mutual fund 
investors make their decisions, with an added emphasis on how they determine whether to choose 
actively or passively managed funds. The study adds to previous research on mutual fund decision 
making by bringing qualitative analysis to a subject that has mostly been researched by using 
quantitative analysis techniques in the past. Also, there are no previous studies into how Finnish 
retail investors choose between actively managed funds and passive funds. 
 
By conducting in depth semi-structured individual interviews for ten Finnish stock fund investors, 
the objective of this paper is to further our understanding of how retail investors, Finnish investors 
in particular, arrive at their investment choices. The interview data was analyzed to find patterns of 
behavior or ideas. The data was also compared to the results of past studies on mutual fund investor 
behavior and behavioral literature. 
 
The results of this study suggest that many Finnish retail investors do not perform any comparisons 
of fund companies, instead choosing the default option, which is most often the investor’s bank. 
According to the data, the main factor in choosing specific funds within the chosen company’s 
options was the geographic location or industry of the stock holdings in the fund. The results differ 
significantly from those of past studies, which have essentially all suggested that the past 
performance of funds is the most important factor in choosing a stock fund. Further analysis 
suggests that the designs of previous questionnaire studies have been somewhat faulty as they left 
out some major decision factors, thus exaggerating the importance of some factors. The findings 
agree with past studies that a significant portion of mutual fund investors are ignorant of many 
central issues regarding their investments. Finally, the research suggests that there is a large group 
of investors who would be potential index fund investors if they had a better knowledge of how 
index funds operate and if index funds were more easily available to them.    
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Tiivistelmä 
Tehokkaat sijoitusrahastomarkkinat, joissa sijoittajat löytävät ja valitsevat rahastot, jotka 
parhaiten sopivat heidän tarpeisiinsa, ovat hyödylliset yhteiskunnan näkökulmasta. Jotta 
markkinat pääsevät lähemmäksi tätä tavoitetta, on tärkeää tutkia miten piensijoittajat tekevät 
rahastovalintoja. Tässä kvalitatiivisessa tutkielmassa tutkitaan sitä miten suomalaiset 
osakerahastosijoittajat tekevät päätöksensä. Lisäksi painotetaan sitä, miten sijoittajat valitsevat 
passiivisten ja aktiivisten rahastojen välillä. Tämä tutkielma laajentaa aikaisempaa tutkimusta 
tuomalla kvalitatiivisen näkökulman aiheeseen, jota on aikaisemmin tutkittu lähinnä 
kvantitatiivisen tutkimuksen menetelmillä. Aikaisemmin ei myöskään ole tutkittu sitä, miten 
suomalaiset piensijoittajat valitsevat passiivisten ja aktiivisten rahastojen välillä.  
 
Toteuttamalla kymmenen perusteellista puolistrukturoitua haastattelua suomalaisille 
osakerahastosijoittajille, tämä tutkimus pyrkii syventämään ymmärrystämme siitä, miten 
erityisesti suomalaiset piensijoittajat tekevät sijoituspäätöksensä. Haastatteluaineiston analyysissä 
pyrittiin löytämään käyttäytymis- sekä ajatusmalleja. Aineistoa myös vertailtiin aikaisempien 
tutkimusten tuloksiin sekä behavioristiseen kirjallisuuteen.  
 
Tutkielman tulokset viittaavat siihen, että monet suomalaiset piensijoittajat eivät vertaile 
rahastoyhtiöitä vaan valitsevat oletusvaihtoehdon, joka on useimmiten sijoittajan pankki. 
Aineiston perusteella tärkein tekijä valinnassa valitun rahastoyhtiön rahastojen välillä on rahaston 
omistamien osakeyritysten maantieteellinen sijainti tai niiden toimiala. Tulokset poikkeavat 
merkittävästi aikaisemmista tutkimuksista, jotka käytännössä kaikki esittävät, että tärkein kriteeri 
rahaston valinnalle on niiden historiallinen tuotto. Syvempi analyysi viittaa siihen, että 
aikaisempien kyselytutkimusten muotoilut ovat olleet osittain virheellisiä, sillä niistä on puuttunut 
tärkeitä kriteerejä, jolloin tiettyjen kriteerien tärkeys on ylikorostunut. Tulokset ovat yhtäpitäviä 
aikaisempien tutkimusten kanssa siitä, että rahastosijoittajat ovat tietämättömiä monista 
keskeisistä sijoituksiinsa liittyvistä asioista. Aineiston perusteella näyttää siltä, että on olemassa 
suuri joukko sijoittajia, jotka sijoittaisivat indeksirahastoihin, jos heillä olisi parempi ymmärrys 
siitä miten ne toimivat, ja jos niitä olisi helpommin saatavissa.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
There has been a plethora of studies on the factors that primarily affect retail investors’ mutual 
fund decision making. This trend is understandable, as mutual funds form a substantial 
section of modern financial markets and the investments of retail investors. An effective 
mutual fund market in which investors find and choose the funds which best suit their needs is 
beneficial from a societal perspective. Therefore, to bring the market closer to this goal, it is 
important to study how decisions are made by retail investors. 
 
Most Finnish and U.S. studies, regardless of the research method, indicate that past 
performance of the funds is the most important factor affecting fund choice. In their research, 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Kasanen, Lipponen, and Puttonen (2001) among others looked at 
flows into funds, Wilcox (2003) performed conjoint experiments to achieve the same 
conclusion, while Capon, Fitzsimmons, and Prince (1996) and Jäntti (2005) achieved the 
same results by asking the investors directly about their preferences.  
 
The fee structure of funds has also been at the center of research in this field. In Jäntti’s 
(2005) study, Finnish retail investors indicated that the fees the funds imposed on investors is 
the second most important factor in their choice of mutual funds. However, studies such as 
Kasanen’s et al. (2001) show that fee size does not have a significant effect on the flow of 
money into funds. Perhaps fee structure is not as important for investors as they would 
themselves suggest, or else we might expect passive investing, which results in significantly 
lower fees, to be much more common. Also, if past performance truly is the most important 
factor in fund choice, then investors should logically believe past performance is a predictor 
of the future. Thus, actively managed funds would seem a logical choice: It is easy to find 
funds that have done exceptionally well in the past. 
 
The decision making process for choosing a mutual fund is a very complex one. Since Savage 
(1954) first described the theory of rational decision making under uncertainty, there has been 
a great deal of research that suggests individuals are not able to, or simply choose not to, 
completely follow the decision making process that is expected of a rational individual 
making economic choices. Simon (1957) introduced the concept of bounded rationality, which 
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means that it is not possible for individuals to acquire all the relevant information regarding 
complex decisions and that individuals lack the required cognitive capabilities to compute all 
the relative information needed to arrive at the optimal solution. Therefore, we use heuristics, 
simple rules of thumb, and other ways of simplifying the decision making process to make 
choices that are satisfactory rather than optimal. The mutual fund choice decision is very 
complex, and the concept of bounded rationality affects it significantly. It is important to 
understand how investors deal with this complexity. 
 
The issue of whether investors should favor passive funds to active funds has also been a hot 
topic in research. Early research in this area, such as Michael C. Jensen's (1968) study, 
showed that actively managed mutual funds have a very tough time in beating the market. As 
this would mean that active management of funds could actually hurt investors, the interest in 
studying the merits of passive versus active management has been enormous. After Burton 
Malkiel brought the idea of passive management of funds further exposure in his 1973 book a 
Random Walk Down Wall Street (Malkiel, 2007), the first index fund appeared on the U.S. 
market in 1976. While the popularity of passive investing has grown substantially, especially 
in the last couple of decades, actively managed funds still dominate the market. There is much 
evidence that, for at least the average investor who doesn’t spend time doing extensive fund 
research, choosing actively managed funds is likely to hurt their earnings. Given this 
evidence, how do retail investors arrive at the decision to invest in actively managed funds?  
 
It is not surprising that the topic of active and passive investing has attracted such strong 
interest, since the topic clearly has very substantial practical and academic implications. 
Naturally, since many studies have found that actively managed funds consistently under-
perform market indexes, investor interest in passively managed funds such as index funds and 
index ETFs has grown rapidly. From the academic perspective, research results indicating that 
active management under-performs market indexes strongly support the efficient market 
hypothesis: If prices are right, fund managers should not be able to beat the market. 
 
Research analyzing active versus passive fund investing, though somewhat mixed, has so far 
mostly supported Jensen's initial findings. Even those who argue that fund managers with skill 
in timing and picking stocks can beat the market largely agree that the average actively 
managed fund earns less than the market return. From the societal perspective, would it not be 
of advantage if money in, for example, retirement accounts gained a higher average return? 
3 
 
Should it, at least to an extent, be the government's responsibility to educate investors on the 
positives of passive investing? If so, it is clearly important to understand how investors make 
fund choices. In the U.S., the arguments for the positives of passive management have even 
caused talk of legislative changes regarding retirement savings. For example, if passed, the 
401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act of 20091 would have required an index 
fund option for all 401(k) participants. 
   
The Finnish mutual fund market has always been considerably behind the U.S. market, and 
the situation is no different when it comes to passive investing. While index funds have been 
marketed for retail investors in the U.S. for decades, the first index funds aimed at retail 
investors only appeared on the Finnish market in 1998. However, interest in index funds 
seems to be quickly growing. Large banks are by far the most substantial mutual fund 
suppliers in Finland, and until 2011 they had never marketed index funds to retail investors. 
But, in September 2011 the first bank finally did so.      
 
For most retail investors, it would seem logical that the default option when investing in 
stocks would be passively managed funds. Even if there are mutual fund managers who 
persistently outperform the market due to stock picking skills, it is very difficult to predict 
which managers will do so. The average retail investor lacks knowledge in areas such as 
portfolio analysis, so predicting which funds may beat the market is even harder. However, 
managed funds still form the majority of mutual fund investments.    
 
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives  
This thesis provides a qualitative study into how private Finnish stock mutual fund investors 
make their decisions, with an added emphasis on how they determine whether to choose 
actively or passively managed funds. By conducting in depth semi-structured individual 
interviews for ten Finnish stock fund investors, my objective is to further our understanding 
of how retail investors, Finnish investors in particular, arrive at their investment choices. By 
                                                 
1 This bill never became law. The bill was proposed in a previous session of Congress. Sessions of Congress 
last two years, and at the end of each session all proposed bills and resolutions that haven't passed are cleared 
from the books. Members often reintroduce bills that did not come up for debate under a new number in the 
next session.  
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understanding how decisions are made we are better able to educate retail investors on the 
investment choices available to them. This knowledge also helps in being able to better 
educate them on how to choose the investment vehicles that best suit their situation.  
 
As most studies have done in the past, I will evaluate which specific fund characteristics, such 
as past performance, fee structure, independent fund ratings, services, and advertising affect 
investor decisions most. Since the mutual fund choice decision is such a complex one, I will 
include behavioral economics concepts in the analysis. Through the inclusion of behavioral 
economics I hope to be able to explain some aspects of individual decision making which do 
not seem rational on the face of it.  
 
Lastly, I will approach the subject of mutual fund choice from the passive versus active 
investing perspective. For example, did investors in actively managed funds make a conscious 
decision to try to beat the market? In other words, have they thought about the characteristics 
of passive and active investing? If so, what do they base their preference for actively managed 
funds on? If not, would they be happy with achieving the average market return?  
 
1.3 Contribution to Existing Research 
While there have been many quantitative studies into what factors are most significant when 
retail investors choose their funds, there is hardly any qualitative research into fund 
investment decision making. Quantitative studies could miss important factors in how 
investors actually operate, as the questions must be limited in scope to allow for effective 
analysis. It is also difficult to perfectly judge beforehand what all the relevant questions are. 
This problem is not as significant in a qualitative interview study, as the researcher is able to 
adjust the questioning on the spot. This study significantly adds to previous research on 
mutual fund decision making by bringing qualitative analysis to a subject that has mostly been 
researched by using quantitative analysis techniques in the past. 
  
The use of the behavioral economics approach will also add to previous research in the area, 
which has mostly centered on finding out opinions and decision factors without trying to 
analyze the behavioral causes. Also, the way in which investors choose between passive and 
active investment options needs further study. To my knowledge, there are no studies into how 
Finnish retail investors choose between actively managed funds and passive funds. 
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1.3 Structure of the Study 
Chapter 2 of the study will provide a brief discussion on what is meant by passive and active 
funds (Section 2.1) and what the arguments for active and passive funds are (Section 2.2). 
These issues are discussed at this early stage in order to further establish that how retail 
investors view passive and active investing is a topic worthy of further studying, in addition to 
studying the more conventional questions regarding the mutual fund choosing process. The 
overview of the growth in passive investing in the United States and Europe (Section 2.3) and 
the overview of the Finnish mutual fund market and the growth of passive investing in 
Finland (Section 2.4) provide a background for the rest of the study, while further backing the 
importance of active and passive investing as a current research topic. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the prior literature and the theoretical framework for the thesis. I will 
discuss prior studies about how and why investors make the mutual fund decisions they make. 
I will also describe the decision making process and discuss behavioral models, heuristics and 
biases which explain investment decisions.  
 
Chapter 4 describes the data and methods used in the study, while also assessing its 
limitations. Chapter 5 establishes the findings of the study, while providing most of the 
analysis of the interview data. Finally, Chapter 6 provides the major conclusions and some 
final discussion.       
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2. Passive and Active Stock Funds and an Overview of the Market 
The growth of the mutual fund industry has been well documented. Therefore, in the 
following sections, I will focus on the growth of the passive fund market. The fact that it has 
grown significantly in recent decades alone makes it worthwhile to study investment attitudes 
towards index investing in addition to mutual fund investing in general.      
 
2.1 Passive and Active Investing and Funds 
The distinction between active and passive investing is straightforward. In active investing, 
the investor makes investment decisions with the goal of beating the market benchmark index. 
Active investing involves continuous buying and selling of assets and relies on the skill of the 
investor in timing the market and picking assets with superior performance. In passive 
investing, the investor purchases a selection of funds with the intention of holding them for 
the long-term, thus minimizing trading costs. The most common strategy in passive investing 
is to purchase a portfolio of funds that tracks the performance of a benchmark index, such as 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Index investing is therefore often used synonymously with 
passive investing. 
 
Actively managed funds are funds where a manager makes active asset management decisions 
in an attempt to outperform the market. Passively managed funds are funds that hold a set of 
funds adhering to a pre-determined strategy, trading only when the strategy requires trading, 
and doing so without subjective decision making from the fund manager. For example, if a 
passively managed fund's portfolio consists of the 50 largest companies by turnover in a given 
market, the fund would adjust its portfolio only when the group of 50 largest companies 
changes. Most passively managed funds hold a portfolio that tracks the returns of a market 
benchmark index. Therefore, the terms passive funds and index funds are often used 
interchangeably.  
 
This study focuses on actively managed mutual funds and index mutual funds. The role of 
index exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in the growth of passive investing internationally is 
significant. However, since the role of ETFs is still rather small in Finland and none of my 
interviewees own ETFs, I will concentrate my analysis on mutual funds. Nevertheless, as far 
as the conundrum of choosing between active and passive management is concerned, the 
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basic logic behind choosing an ETF and an index mutual fund is very similar. Therefore, I 
believe many of the past studies regarding active vs. passive investing apply largely to ETFs 
as well. As nearly all ETFs are index ETFs, I will use the term ETF when discussing index 
ETFs. In the next sections ETFs are prominent, as I discuss the growth of passive investing in 
the United States and Europe to show how investor attitudes towards passive investing are 
changing. 
 
The reasons why mutual funds have been and continue to be a good investment option for 
retail investors include the services the fund company provides, efficient diversification, low 
transaction costs and professional management. These reasons among others have proven so 
significant that the mutual fund market has grown tremendously. However, in the case of 
index funds, the role of professional management is negligible. The following section 
discusses some of the arguments for both active and index investing, revealing how divided 
the finance research community is on the subject.    
 
2.2 The Arguments for Passive and Active Funds 
While the purpose of this study is not to determine whether active funds outperform passive 
funds, it is important to discuss the issue, as choosing between active and passive funds is one 
of the most essential decisions an investor should make. Also, as discussed in the 
introduction, it has been one of the hot topics in investing for the past few decades. The 
following overview of past studies shows why the issue of passive versus active investing is 
something that investors should at least consider. As the issue is so compelling and even has 
welfare ramifications, it is reasonable that studies are made into how individuals choose 
between the two strategies. 
 
Michael C. Jensen (1968) first studied mutual fund returns from 1945 to 1964 and found that 
not only do actively managed mutual funds on average underperform market averages, but 
also that there was no evidence that individual active funds could consistently beat the 
market. Jensen’s further study (1969) found further evidence that fund managers are unable to 
predict future asset prices to outperform the market and that inferior performance persists over 
decades. Ever since those studies were published, the argument on the merits of passive and 
active funds has been continuous. Understandably so, as active funds form a lion’s share of 
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the mutual fund market and thus provide a significant amount of jobs for finance 
professionals. 
 
Sharpe (1991) introduced the arithmetic of active management: 
If "active" and "passive" management styles are defined in sensible ways, it 
must be the case that 
(1) before costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar will equal the 
return on the average passively managed dollar and 
(2) after costs, the return on the average actively managed dollar will be less 
than the return on the average passively managed dollar 
 
The argument is simple, and clearly holds when stocks held by active managers and passive 
managers are considered as a whole. However, it remains possible that active mutual fund 
managers form a subset of active managers that outperform other active managers and thus 
also passively managed funds. However, practically all research agrees that actively managed 
funds on average lose to their passive equivalents. The question which remains a topic of 
fevered discussion and study is whether there are a significant amount of actively managed 
funds that outperform passive funds consistently, which would contradict Jensen’s initial 
findings. 
 
Several more recent studies have challenged Jensen’s early conclusions and argued that some 
active funds have persistent superior performance. Hendricks et al. (1993) found evidence 
that superior performance of active funds persists over a one year horizon but dissipates 
afterwards. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) found that funds have superior performance up to 
five years. Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) also found evidence that active funds can have 
consistent superior performance. 
 
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1992) argue that the superior performance of active funds 
found in other studies is explained by survivorship bias. If funds which have ceased to exist 
due to poor performance are not calculated into the performance measures, the performance 
of successful active fund managers is overvalued. Malkiel (1995) studied mutual fund returns 
from 1971 to 1991 with a mutual fund sample that eliminated the survivorship bias and found 
no evidence for the persistence of superior returns of actively managed mutual funds. 
9 
 
However, Elton et al. (1996), using a sample free of survivorship bias, found that risk 
adjusted superior returns of active funds persist both in the short and long term. They were 
able to construct active fund portfolios based on past data that had positive risk adjusted 
returns. In contrast, Carhart (1997) found that superior mutual fund performance does not 
represent stock picking skills. He finds that any persistent above average returns can be 
explained by common factors in stock returns, differences in fees and transaction costs. While 
Bollen and Busse (2005) find evidence for short term performance persistence, it is so small 
that after taking into account transfer costs and taxes it is better for investors to keep to a buy 
and hold strategy. 
 
The previous paragraphs reviewed only some of the studies regarding the performance of 
active funds, but without going into the discussion further it is reasonable to state that, as of 
yet, there is no definitive answer to whether it is possible to predict which actively managed 
funds will provide superior returns. However, Harless and Peterson (1998) state that since the 
focus of the discussion has been on superior returns, it has been to a large extent ignored that 
practically all of the studies have found strong evidence for persistent inferior performance of 
active funds. This result is significant and should perhaps be given more attention than has 
been done in the past.  
 
For the individual retail investor the implications of the research reviewed here is 
straightforward: Even if it is possible, it is very difficult to find the active funds that will have 
superior performance in the future. The following section reviews how, despite the ambiguity 
of results into the merits of active and passive investing, passive investing has grown 
significantly during the past decades.           
 
2.3 The Growth of Passive Investing in the U.S. and Europe 
The world's first retail index fund, First Index Investment Trust, now called the Vanguard 500 
Index Fund, was started in 1976 in the U.S. However, it was not until the last couple of 
decades that the growth of the index fund market truly took off. Figure 1 shows the growth of 
equity index mutual funds in the U.S. since 1993. 
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In addition to this significant growth in absolute numbers, equity index mutual funds as a 
percentage of all equity mutual funds have grown as well, as figure 2. shows. This points to a 
significant change in investor's attitudes towards passive investing. 
 
 
While total net assets in U.S. Stock mutual funds at the end of 2010, at $5.67 billion, were 
below their numbers in 2006 ($5.91 billion) and 2007 ($6.52 billion), U.S. equity index 
mutual funds had the highest year-end net total assets in the history of the asset class in 2010. 
 
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
Figure 1. Total Net Assets of U.S. Equity Index Mutual Funds. 
Source of data: 2011 Investment Company Fact Book. http://www.icifactbook.org/ 
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Figure 2. U.S. Equity Index Mutual Funds as a Percentage of All U.S. Equity Mutual Funds
Source of data: 2011 Investment Company Fact Book. http://www.icifactbook.org/
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The other index fund type, ETFs, have also experienced rapid growth in recent years. The first 
ETFs became available in the U.S. in 1993 and in Europe in 1999, and figure 3. depicts the 
growth of the ETF market since.  
 
The U.S ETF and index mutual fund markets have experienced very similar growth trends 
within the last decade, clearly indicating a growing interest in passive investing overall. I 
could not find accurate data on the growth of the index mutual fund market in Europe, but 
since the European ETF market is following a similar growth trend as the U.S. equivalent, 
albeit lagging it a few years, I would expect to see similar growth in the European index fund 
market as in the U.S. equivalent.  
 
Finally, to gain an idea on the overall growth of passive investing in the U.S, I calculated the 
total net assets of passive stock funds (both index mutual funds and ETFs) as a percentage of 
the total net assets in the whole stock fund market (mutual funds and ETFs). The percentage 
of passive stock funds has steadily grown from a mere 3.2 percent in 1993 to 21.8 percent at 
the end of 2010. Over a fifth of all assets in U.S. stock funds is now invested in passively 
managed funds, signifying a monumental change in investor attitudes in less than two 
decades.         
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Figure 3. The Total Net Assets of U.S. and European Stock ETFs
Sources of data: 2011 Investment Company Fact Book: http://www.icifactbook.org/ 
and Industry Review from BlackRock: http://www.blackrockinternational.com
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2.4 The Finnish Mutual Fund Industry and the Growth of Passive Investing 
Since the ETF-market is still taking its baby steps in Finland, I will focus on mutual funds in 
providing an overview of the Finnish stock fund market. The first Finnish mutual funds only 
appeared on the market in 1987, which is much later than in major international markets such 
as the United States, where the first mutual fund, the Massachusetts Investors' Trust in 
Boston, was established as early as 1924. However, since the mid 1990's, the growth of the 
Finnish mutual fund industry has been rapid. I gathered all the following data regarding the 
Finnish mutual fund market from past Mutual Fund Reports, which are monthly reports 
provided by the Finnish Mutual Fund Association2. Figure 4 shows the total assets under 
management in Finnish mutual funds at the end of September from 1997 to 2011 and the total 
assets under management in Finnish stock funds in the same period.  
 
The total assets under management have grown 17-fold in that time, while the growth of stock 
mutual funds has been even faster than the overall mutual fund market, having grown nearly 
22-fold in the time period. However, it is clear that the growth of both the overall mutual fund 
market and the stock mutual fund market has been nonexistent for half a decade.  
 
                                                 
2 Available at http://www.sijoitustutkimus.fi 
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The growth of the stock index fund market differs significantly from the growth described 
above. After the first Finnish stock index mutual fund, Seligson & Co's FOX-indeksirahasto, 
was established in 1998, the stock index fund market has seen very large changes. At the end 
of September in 2001, Finnish stock index funds held EUR 496 million assets under 
management, or 10.7 percent of all stock funds. In the next five years the market had grown to 
EUR 2 358 million in 2006, or 12.3 percent of all stock funds. Finally, at the end of 
September the market had shrunk to EUR 1 347 million, or 8.0 percent of all stock funds. A 
quick glance at these numbers seems to reveal that after an initial growth, the interest in stock 
index funds has waned in the last five years. However, this seems to be the case only 
regarding institutional investors.  
 
For the purposes of this study, I define funds marketed to retail investors as funds that require 
an initial investment of no more than EUR 1000. Using this definition, there were no index 
funds marketed to retail investors at the end of September 2001, while the whole selection of 
stock index funds consisted of only 9 funds. In September 2006, there were 21 stock index 
funds, 6 of which were aimed at retail investors. At the end of September 2011, the selection 
of stock index funds contained 24 funds. More importantly, 15 of those funds were now aimed 
at retail investors. Also, while the total money inflow into stock index funds was negative in 
the last five years, and while the overall mutual fund and stock mutual fund markets shrank in 
the same time period, the assets under management for the 6 stock index funds marketed to 
retail investors already in existence in 2006 grew from EUR 185 million to EUR 228 million.  
 
Of the nine new index funds now aimed at retail investors, four were completely new funds, 
while five funds changed their policy to allow lower initial investments in order to attract 
retail investors. Importantly, three of the six funds that changed their policy to allow for retail 
investors were operated by OP-Rahastoyhtiö Oy, the second largest mutual fund company in 
Finland with a market share of 21,4 percent in September 2011. OP is the first Finnish bank to 
offer index funds to retail investors. The change took place as recently as September 29th 
2011, so it seems that the larger players in the Finnish mutual fund market are slowly 
realizing the potential growth in offering index funds to retail investors.  
 
An interesting aspect of OP-Rahastoyhtiö's change in policy to allow smaller initial 
investments is that the expense ratio of the index funds marketed to retail investors, at 0,75 
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percent3, is considerably higher than for similar funds managed by smaller mutual fund 
companies (e.g. 0.45 percent for Seligson's similar index funds). Large Finnish banks have 
always been reluctant to offer index funds to retail investors due to the fact that, without 
active management, the high fees that naturally generate profits are hard to justify. The banks' 
position in the market has been strong enough, due to the large number of Finns who handle 
all their finances in the same bank, that they have not felt the need to offer anything but 
expensive actively managed funds. But, as the market analysis above shows, it now looks as if 
the best possibility for growth in the mutual fund industry is in index funds aimed at retail 
investors. So, it looks likely that OP has sensed the need to ride the wave of retail investor's 
growing interest in index funds, while trying to guarantee high profits by charging higher fees 
than other smaller index fund competitors. The fees are still much lower than for their own 
actively managed funds, a fact which they probably hope is enough to be able to attract any 
new investment from customer's who might have looked elsewhere for index funds. Investors 
accept the higher fees of the banks' actively managed funds due to the convenience of doing 
all business in the same place. Whether this is the case with regards to index funds remains to 
be seen. Ultimately, if OP's strategy is successful, we can expect other major players to follow 
suit quickly. This would likely result in a very large growth in assets under management for 
index funds marketed to retail investors.   
  
                                                 
3 OP-Rahastoyhtiö offers a bonus of 0,25% for participants in their bonus program, who have at least EUR 
5000 total in different accounts. This would mean an expense ratio of 0,5%.  
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3. A Review of Research in Fund Investor Decision Making 
The decision making process in picking a mutual fund differs greatly from that of investing 
directly in the stock market. This is common sense, as a mutual fund retail investor leaves the 
finer points of risk and return analysis of stocks to the fund manager. Or, in the case of index 
funds, takes that analysis out of the picture completely. Even though I would expect mutual 
fund retail investors to place some emphasis on risk and return considerations, they are likely 
to not be as substantial as could be expected of an investor purchasing individual stocks. 
Capon, Fitzsimmons, and Prince (1996) argue that by only relying on the principles of 
modern finance theory, which assumes that investors should make their decisions based solely 
on a risk-return analysis, we will gain only a partial understanding of fund investor purchase 
decision making. With this view in mind, this study will consider retail investor's mutual fund 
decisions comprehensively, taking into account a variety of factors such as mutual fund 
characteristics, advertisement and behavioral models. The following sections review the 
research in these areas. The behavioral models will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
3.1 Past Performance 
Regardless of the method of research, previous studies largely agree that past performance is 
the most important factor affecting investor's fund choice. Wilcox (2003) performed a 
conjoint experiment into mutual fund decision making, which showed that investors place 
substantial emphasis on past returns. Studies looking at the flow of funds into mutual funds 
(e.g. Kasanen, Lipponen, and Puttonen, 2001; Ippolito, 1992; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Warther 
1995) agree that they are positively correlated with past performance. Sirri and Tufano (1998) 
found that investors indeed do base their decisions on past performance, but even more so 
when the recent performance is exceptionally good. They also discovered that positive 
performance increases fund inflows much more than negative performance increases fund 
outflows, which is evidence for the disposition effect (see Section 4.1.2). Based on an analysis 
of Finnish data, Kasanen, Lipponen, and Puttonen (2001) also concluded that investors 
choose funds based on past performance, and they also find the same asymmetry with regards 
to very good recent performance as Sirri and Tufano did. However, they further found that 
investors who invest in funds that are distributed through banks seem to know little of past 
performance. This is important from the Finnish perspective, since banks are such major 
players in the mutual fund market. 
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Studies conducted by interviews and questionnaires also show that investor decisions are 
mostly driven by past performance considerations. Capon et al. (1996) carried out phone 
questionnaires of a diverse sample of mutual fund investors, and the great majority stated that 
past performance was the main deciding factor in choosing between funds. Jäntti (2005) used 
a questionnaire to reveal the preferences of the investors of a large Finnish mutual fund 
provider. The investors named past performance as the most important fund characteristic in 
making a fund choice. In their interview study of 2000 American mutual fund investors, 
Alexander, Jones, and Nigro (1998) found that approximately 24 percent of respondents 
believed that a fund with above average returns in the past year would earn above average 
returns in the following year, while 70.6 percent believed that these funds would earn average 
returns in the following year.  
 
The fact that practically all studies agree that past performance is the main driving factor in 
investor's fund choice yet most financial research indicates that past performance has limited 
predictive value for future performance is perhaps alarming. However, it does partly explain 
the average investor's continual preference for managed funds. Since past performance is used 
as a deciding factor, it is easy to find funds with recent exceptional returns.   
 
Independent fund ratings such as Morningstar are often used in conjunction with past 
performance. Knuutila et al. (2007) found that funds with a five star rating receive much 
larger flows than funds with lower ratings. However, this is dependent on the funds being 
distributed by non-bank fund companies. In Jäntti’s (2005) study, independent ratings were 
rated the third most important decision factor in choosing mutual funds, only behind past 
performance and fees. 
 
3.2 Costs of Funds and Fund Advertising 
Logic would suggest that as the only return which can be completely predicted, the costs of 
funds should hold great importance in investment decisions. However, research tends not to 
agree. Kasanen et al. (2001) analyzed fund flows and found that the cost structure of funds is 
not related to fund demand. In Capon's et al. (1996) study, management fees were a relatively 
unimportant factor for 75 percent of investors. Alexander et al. (1998) also found that 
expenses were not an important factor for many investors. This is largely explained by the fact 
that only 15.7 percent of respondents believed that there was an inverse relationship between 
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returns and expenses, while around 20 percent believed that funds with higher expenses have 
higher returns on average.  
 
Then again, in Jäntti's (2005) study Finnish investors named fund costs as the second most 
important factor, only behind past performance. Sirri and Tufano's (1998) findings were more 
ambiguous. While they did find that changes in fund fees and flows were inversely related, 
they also found that search costs of investors are an important determinant of fund flows. 
And, therefore, higher fees related to higher marketing costs produce positive flows. 
Advertising is a major contributor to the costs of a fund, yet understandably works in the 
opposite direction when it comes to flows into funds, so it is logical that I discuss it here.  
 
Basing their study on an analysis of Finnish mutual fund data on the mutual fund family level, 
Korkeamäki, Puttonen, and Smythe (2007) showed that there is a positive relationship 
between advertising expenditure and flows. They concluded that fund families that include 
high performing funds increase flows by advertising. However, their analysis shows that 
advertising fund families with no high performing funds does not increase flows into the 
funds. Sirri and Tufano's (1998) findings support the conclusion that advertising is most 
beneficial to high performance funds. Korkeamäki et al. further find that fund families, which 
spend proportionally more on advertising, receive higher flows. This looks to be in agreement 
with the cost of funds research reviewed above: Higher advertising expenses result in higher 
costs for investors, but investors are rather indifferent to these costs. 
 
Jain and Wu (2000) found that mutual fund companies choose to advertise the funds which 
experienced superior results compared to market benchmarks in the pre-advertising period, 
but the post advertisement performance of the funds on average was significantly below the 
benchmarks. As discussed in Section 3.2, past performance is a major deciding factor in fund 
choice, so the fact that companies concentrate their marketing on funds with recent superior 
performance is not surprising. Jain and Wu also found that the strategy seems to work, since 
their analysis shows that advertised funds attract much more investments than other similar 
funds. They conclude that the results should have policy implications, since fund sponsors 
base their advertising on an issue, past performance, which is misplaced, yet do so knowing 
that it attracts funds. 
 
18 
 
3.3 Are Mutual Fund Investors Naïve? 
Capon et al. (1996) found that a significant portion of mutual fund investors are ignorant of 
many central issues regarding their investments. Of the investors interviewed for the 
questionnaire, only 60.7 percent knew the fee structure of the funds, while only 25 percent 
were aware of the investment management style of their funds. Over a quarter of the 
respondents could not describe how much, or even if any, international stock their funds held. 
Alexander’s et al. (1998) results were similar, as they found that only 18.9 percent of the 
respondents were able to give an estimate of the expenses of their largest fund, while only 43 
percent claimed to have known the expenses at the time of investment. They even found that 6 
percent of respondents did not know that it is possible to lose money by investing in stock 
mutual funds. While they found that the financial literacy of mutual fund investors as a whole 
leaves a lot of room for improvement, it is especially true for investors investing through 
banks, which is the distribution channel used by most Finnish retail investors. Goetzmann, 
Greenwald, and Huberman (1992) go so far as to suggest that there is a large group of 
investors who do not know or do not care if their investments perform poorly. In this study, I 
will also evaluate the general knowledge investors have of their investments. 
 
Harless and Peterson (1998) found that mutual fund investors do not consider risk and return 
in a way that we would expect from rational investors. Instead, they argue that investors are 
likely to use intuitive judgments that are too much weighted by recent excessive returns. 
Furthermore, investors are insensitive to moderate differences in the fees of funds when 
making predictions on future performance, and thus overlook the validity of small differences 
in fees in predicting long-term performance.      
 
3.4 Investment Advisors and Brokers 
Based on the studies described in the previous section, it seems that fund companies and 
investment advisors do a poor job of educating their customers prior to the investment 
decision. Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano (2006) found that investment advisors and 
brokers provide hardly any benefits to consumers. They found that the funds bought through 
these channels have higher fees, lower performance, and display higher trend-seeking 
behavior. 
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4. Decision Making and Behavioral Finance 
4.1 The Decision Making Process 
Savage (1954) first described the modern theory of rational decision making under 
uncertainty, which relies on the method of subjective expected utility. In this decision process 
individuals first give probabilities to different outcomes, then assign utility values to these 
outcomes, and finally choose the option with the highest expected value. In economics, 
rational behavior means making decisions that maximize one's utility function under given 
constraints such as lack of resources, time etc.  
 
Capon et al. (1996) describe a purchase decision model used by consumer behavior 
researchers as it applies to fund investment decisions: First, investors gather information 
about different funds from both their own memory and external sources such as friends, 
investment advisors, news, and advertisement. Next, investors develop a set of product and 
service attributes (e.g. past performance, fund costs) that are important for them in choosing 
between the different fund alternatives. Finally, investors use these attributes to choose the 
funds to purchase. When you combine this decision process described by Capon et al. with 
Savage’s theory of rational decision making under uncertainty, a rational decision maker 
would be expected to assign utility values to all fund attributes, combine these to come up 
with a total utility value for each fund, and finally choose the fund with the highest expected 
value. 
 
It is clear that the decision process above is not one that investors will be able to rigorously 
follow, and that there are limitations to how comprehensively people can follow such a 
process. The first, and most obvious of these limitations, is bounded rationality, first 
introduced by Herbert Simon (1957). Simon's bounded rationality, now an important aspect of 
behavioral economics, takes into account human limitations in both knowledge and cognitive 
capacity: A person cannot possible gather all the relevant facts and our brains are not wholly 
reliable and not able to compute all relevant information. For these reasons, Simon asserts that 
rather than making choices that maximize our utility, we satisfice. That is, due to the 
limitations in our cognitive capabilities we are likely to often choose the first option that 
satisfies a given need or to choose an option that satisfies most needs, rather than looking for 
the optimal option. 
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Let us assume we have arrived at a situation where an investor is trying to choose between 
Finnish stock mutual funds. He has 255 separate fund choices available to him, all of which 
have a myriad of attributes that affect the investor's decision. Many of these attributes, such as 
how the investor expects the fund to perform in the future, are uncertain. It becomes evident 
that the modern theory of rational decision making under uncertainty does not entirely 
describe the decision process of a rational retail investor, and that the concept of bounded 
rationality applies. The complexity of the decision means that people find ways of reducing 
the complexity of these decisions. The following sections discuss some of the ways in which 
people, due to bounded rationality, have simplified their decision making processes, and how 
this can affect their actual decisions through biases and other factors. Also, modern finance 
theory expects people to always make the choice with the highest returns given a certain risk 
level, but several factors can make investors deviate from trying to achieve this. 
 
4.2 Heuristics and Biases  
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) state that people use heuristic principles, in other words 
simple rules of thumb, to make simple judgmental operations out of complex tasks, such as 
predicting values. These heuristics are mostly advantageous, but can often lead to biases, 
errors, and deviations from the choices one might expect if the choice maker had complete 
information and unlimited mental abilities. I will discuss some of these heuristics and the 
biases caused by them that are relevant to the investment decision process being researched 
here.    
 
4.2.1 Representativeness Heuristic  
Insensitivity to predictability is a bias that arises when people are asked to make numerical 
predictions, such as the future value of a stock. If the company is given a favorable 
description, a prediction of a high future value will be most representative of the description, 
even though how the company is described might not have any predictive value for the value 
of the stock. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) Similarly, a Finnish retail investor could have a 
very favorable view of a bank, and would thus expect the mutual funds of the company to 
have high future values. However, past returns show that Finnish bank mutual funds perform 
poorly compared to those of smaller mutual fund providers. Attributes such as the bank's 
reliability and good service in arranging a mortgage do obviously not describe the skill level 
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of the fund manager compared to other managers, yet these attributes can lead the investor to 
favorably predict the future performance of the bank's funds. 
 
The representativeness heuristic could also explain why past returns have such a significant 
effect on fund flows. In people’s minds, funds that have superior past performance are likely 
more representative of funds that will have superior future performance. This ignores the base 
probability, which is that past performance has little predictive value for future performance. 
Also, as people see patterns of past performance, for example a consistent superior return for 
the past two years, they are likely to attribute the pattern to the skill of the fund manager even 
though probability suggests that some funds will show such patterns of performance even 
without any stock picking skill present.    
 
Another interesting faulty intuition that Kahneman and Tversky (1974) introduce, is the 
failure to account for regression toward the mean. As we have seen in Section 2.2, mutual 
funds show a regression toward the mean. Funds that performed exceptionally well in the past 
most often do not do so in the future. The tendency of people to disregard this regression 
toward the mean means that investors expect the exceptional performance to continue, thus 
believing in the predictive value of past returns, and thus picking stocks with exceptional past 
returns. 
 
4.2.2 Loss and Risk Aversion, the Disposition Effect 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) claim that people are loss averse, which means that they feel 
losses more intensely than gains. The amount of utility lost is higher when a person loses 
1000 euros than the amount of utility gained if a person wins 1000 euros. Loss aversion leads 
to risk aversion as people are inclined to avoid risky choices to avoid losses. For example, in a 
coin toss, a 50-50 proposition, people usually demand much higher winnings than losses to 
accept the bet. That is, people require a risk premium for assets under risk; the risk premium 
being the minimum amount of compensation needed to accept the risk.  
 
The reluctance to realize losses, even when standard theory suggests they should be realized, 
was first introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Shefrin and Statman (1985) found 
evidence for this anomaly in financial markets and coined it the disposition effect, while 
studies such as Odean (1998) have also backed its validity. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
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gained similar results with Finnish stock market data. These studies all found that people are 
much likelier to hold on to losing assets than they are winners. The tendency is in large part 
explained by loss aversion, as investors would be forced to recognize their losses if they sold 
the assets below purchase value. 
 
4.2.3 Availability Heuristic 
The availability heuristic deals with how people estimate the frequency of an event based on 
how easily examples of said event come to mind. An example of a bias due to this heuristic is 
that people are likely to overestimate the frequency of heart attacks among middle-aged 
people, because heart attacks are very easy to remember. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) In 
the case of stock funds, it is easy to remember cases of stock funds dramatically 
outperforming the market, as those cases are very visible in the media, while cases of funds 
underperforming are much less represented and thus cases of it are difficult to bring to mind. 
Thus, an investor is likely to overestimate the probability of actively managed funds 
performing exceptionally well, and thus likely to overestimate the skills of mutual fund 
managers in general. 
 
4.2.4 Cognitive Dissonance and the Endowment Effect 
Cognitive dissonance, first introduced by Festinger (1957), is the tendency to modify beliefs 
to justify past actions. The main idea of the theory is that as individuals are distressed by the 
discrepancy of past actions and new evidence, they change their beliefs to lower this distress. 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997) argue that in the world of investments, individuals adjust their 
beliefs on how their investments have performed to feel better about these choices. They find 
that cognitive dissonance causes investors to have a positive bias towards their investment 
performance, and that this can explain why investors do not move away from poorly 
performing funds as much as expected.  
 
The endowment effect, coined by Thaler (1980), argues that people believe something they 
own is better than something they do not own. The effect also predicts that people would 
demand much more to give up what they own than to acquire it. It could also partly explain 
why people are more willing to keep their poorly performing investments than would be 
23 
 
expected from a rational decision maker and why they consider them to be performing better 
than they actually are. 
 
4.2.5 Mental Accounting 
Mental accounting describes how people keep track of where their money goes, and how they, 
often subconsciously, evaluate and categorize transactions and other financial events. Mental 
accounting often results in decisions that violate rational economic theory, as individual 
mental accounting rules are not neutral. The attractiveness of a decision can be influenced by 
a number of mental accounting decisions, such as in which mental account to group a 
purchase. Mental accounting violates the economic principle of fungibility, as the same 
amount of money in one account is not a perfect substitute for the same amount of money in 
another account.  
 
A classic example of mental accounting is how differently people treat money received that 
they did not predict, such as lottery winnings or a surprise bonus, to wages. People tend to 
spend this money much more freely than wages. (Thaler, 1985 and 1999) Also, people will 
evaluate cash completely differently from money in mutual funds. Cash is in a mental account 
for current consumption while money in mutual funds is in an account for consumption in the 
future. Furthermore, if the objective of a mutual fund is in the very distant future, such as with 
retirement, it is possibly felt as vague. Therefore, investors are much likelier to take 
substantial risks that they would not consider with something as tangible as cash, even though 
traditional economic theory would suggest that all money is equal after taking into account 
the time value of money. 
 
4.2.6 Framing Effects and Status Quo Bias 
While the theory of rational decision making would expect people to have the same 
preferences regardless of the framing of the question, Kahneman and Tversky (1981) show 
that preferences often change due to the framing of the question. That is, people answer the 
same question differently depending on how the question is presented. The question of which 
fund a retail investor should choose is a very complex one, the framing of which is affected 
by a multitude of factors such as conversations, advertisements, news items, analyst's 
opinions, and financial advisor's advice and also factors that they may not even consciously 
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notice. It is apparent that the fund industry should aim to frame the question in a way that 
would bring them the most revenues. And as managed funds bring the most revenues due to 
the higher fee structures, this could mean, for example, emphasizing returns of funds that 
have performed well and downplaying the importance of costs.  
 
Thaler, Sunstein and Balz (2010) call those who create the environment in which decisions 
are made choice architects. One of their main claims is that people often choose the default 
option. Others agree that in choosing between alternatives, people tend to keep their current 
behavior as the default option (Samuelsson and Zeckhauser, 1988; Kahneman and Knetsch, 
1991). This tendency is also known as the status quo bias. The option that requires the 
investor to do nothing is the one that many investors choose by default. A well-established 
example of the importance of the default option is the case of legislation regarding organ 
donors, as the percentage of organ donors is much higher in countries were donating organs is 
the default option than in countries where the donor has to choose to participate in the organ 
donation program.  
 
In the Finnish mutual fund market, the status quo option is actively managed funds. The 
visibility and availability of managed funds has so far been much greater than that of passive 
funds, which has created the status quo of most retail investors having invested in them for a 
long time. Now, even when index funds are gaining more visibility in the market, many 
investors are likely to be affected by the status quo bias and continue to invest in managed 
funds, even if they observe their investments underperforming the index and passive funds 
could be a more suitable option. Another default option for many Finnish investors is 
investing through their banks, as many Finns perform all their monetary transactions through 
a single bank and are not likely to consider other options. 
 
Governments have taken an increasing role as choice architects in recent past in the fund 
industry. For example, they require that funds disclose certain things that they find imperative 
for investor’s decision making. The British government has even established a small new 
branch of government called the Behavioral Insights Team. Their goal is to help the 
government influence people’s choices by framing the choices in ways that result in more 
behavior that is desired by the government. This is largely based on the concept of nudging, 
introduced by Richard H. Thaler and Cass B. Sunstein in their book Nudge: Improving 
Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008). Nudging means getting people to 
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make choices based on the way the options are presented. Sunstein and Thaler aim to justify 
nudging by the government with their concept of libertarian paternalism. The libertarian part 
of the concept insist that people should be able to do what they want, i.e. opt out of 
arrangements, while the paternalistic part of the concept maintains that choice architects are 
justified in trying to influence people’s behavior to improve their lives. (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2008) 
 
If more evidence backs the argument that actively managed funds on average do worse than 
index funds, it would be of advantage for society if more money went into index funds and 
not into the pockets of fund managers. In this case, the government could, as choice 
architects, help frame the fund choice decision in such a way that index funds became the 
default option. The legislation needed for this to occur could for example include requiring 
investment advisers to explain index funds to investors.  
 
4.2.7 Investments as Entertainment 
It is possible that some investment decisions are affected by the entertainment value of the 
investment. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) found that some investors draw entertainment 
value from trading, and thus do it excessively even though this diminishes their expected 
returns. For these investors, the costs of excessive trading are offset by the gains in 
entertainment value from gambling, discussing the trades, and anticipating the results. 
Similarly, there are likely to be fund investors who choose a fund for the entertainment value 
of, for example, seeing how it does against other funds and the market index. While the 
monetary reward might not be positive, this is rational behavior as the monetary losses are 
offset by the entertainment value. 
 
  
26 
 
5. Methods and Data 
To conduct my study on the way Finnish retail investors make choices regarding their stock 
funds, I performed a qualitative interview study of ten Finnish mutual fund retail investors. 
The goal of the interviews was to look at the fund decision process from the perspective of 
individual retail investors to be able to find out what the driving factors are behind the fund 
purchase decisions. I also aimed to gain an understanding on the attitudes of the investors on 
some key issues, such as active and passive investing. In addition to the ten qualitative 
interviews, the same interviewees also answered two questions from the questionnaire used 
by Jäntti (2005) to enable me to more effectively compare my results to past studies and to be 
able to judge the reliability of past studies. 
 
In this chapter I will describe the research process. I will begin by describing the process of 
interviewing the investors, which will be followed by a discussion on how the interview data 
was analyzed. Finally, I will assess the study and its limitations. 
 
5.1 Carrying Out the Semi-Structured Interview 
The research interviews were carried out by using the semi-structured interview technique 
often used in qualitative studies. Research interviews are usually grouped into three 
categories, based on the role of the interviewer and the degree to which the interview follows 
a preplanned structure and preplanned questions. Of the three groups, the structured interview 
is mostly used in order to achieve quantitative results. To achieve this, it is important to 
ensure that each interviewee is asked the same questions in the same order and, therefore, it is 
usually carried by using forms. At the other end of the scale is the unstructured interview, in 
which the interviewer only asks open-ended questions. The answer to a previous question 
determines the next question, and the interview is often very close to a normal conversation. 
The semi-structured interview, also known as the themed interview in Finnish research 
methodology, falls between these two ends of the scale. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008) Of the 
studies of the mutual fund decision on an individual level that have been discussed here, the 
study carried out by Capon et al. (1996) used the structured form of interview, while none 
have used the semi-structured or unstructured interview method. 
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The structure of the interview is based around themes and questions focused on the subject at 
hand. The framework of the interview works as a guiding tool for the interviewer, but the 
order, weight, and even the content of the questions can vary between interviews. (Koskinen, 
Alasuutari, and Peltonen 2005, Eskola and Suoranta, 2008) I chose the semi-structured 
interview method, as the interactive nature of it allowed me to truly get to the issues behind 
the interviewees’ decisions making, while the structure allowed me to make sure I was able to 
address all the issues I needed to address in order to effectively compare and analyze the 
research data. Past studies have used questionnaires to study retail investors’ mutual fund 
decision making. From the beginning, I felt that by using the semi-structured interview 
method instead, I could gain a more thorough picture of the complex individual decision 
making process.  
 
In addition to the questions posed by the interviewer, the interviewee can also bring up new 
questions and deviate from the themes (Eskola & Suoranta, 2008). I aimed at letting the 
interviewees guide the discussion as much as possible, so that the conversation would flow as 
naturally as possible. This minimized my influence on the answers. The questions I posed 
regarding risk, however, were exactly the same for each interviewee to allow for more reliable 
comparison. With the use of the semi-structured interview, I was able to study a wide variety 
of issues regarding the mutual fund decision process on an individual level. 
 
The interview was structured around seven main themes. Firstly, the interviewees were asked 
to freely describe their process of making their mutual fund investment, including, but not 
limited to, the circumstances surrounding the decision and the factors they considered when 
making the decision. The other six themes specifically addressed were advertising, costs of 
funds, past performance, how they viewed beating the market, risk attitudes, and attitudes 
towards index investing. The first three themes mentioned in the preceding sentence were 
suggested by previous studies on mutual fund decision making on the individual level, while 
the latter three were specifically chosen for this study in order to canvass the interviewees’ 
attitude toward passive investing. The basic framework of the interview can be found in 
Appendix 2. The additional questionnaire questions, adopted from Jäntti’s study, can also be 
found in appendix 3.    
 
I chose the interviewees with the aim of achieving a diverse group of investors with regards to 
age, gender, salary, investment experience, and size of investments, so as to represent the 
28 
 
average retail investor as effectively as possible despite the very limited size of the 
interviewee group. Appendix 1 shows the distribution of these interviewee characteristics 
except for investment experience, which is thoroughly detailed in the findings. Since an 
important theme in this study is index investing, I also wanted to include index investors. The 
interviewees were people I know or people suggested by them. All interviewees were 
enthusiastic in their discussion on the topic and seemed to freely discuss their feelings, 
beliefs, and opinions.    
 
The interviews were conducted in February and March 2012. The length of the interviews 
ranged from 27 minutes to 45 minutes. I asked the interviewees not to prepare for the 
interview in any way that would depart from their normal activities involving their mutual 
funds. If I had asked for them to, for example, check how their funds had performed 
compared to benchmark indexes and this was something that they normally would not do, it 
could have affected their attitudes towards their investments in a way that was influenced by 
me. And, after all, I wanted their responses to reflect their own attitudes at that specific 
moment in time. However, I allowed the interviewees to check their investment accounts on-
line to check issues which had already been discussed to see whether this would change their 
views on the matter. For example, I allowed some interviewees to check the fee structure of 
their funds after we had already discussed their views on the importance of fees. If an 
interviewee was completely uninformed with a central topic of discussion, such as an index 
fund, I gave them a basic definition of the topic. The interviewees responded to the two 
additional questionnaire questions by e-mail a few weeks after the interviews. 
 
I recorded each interview. To allow the interviewees to be as frank as possible on their views, 
it was very important to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees. Therefore, I limit the 
background information revealed of each interviewee. However, this does not limit the 
analysis to a great extent: As this study is not attempting to make statistically valid 
conclusions, it is not important to tie the age, gender, investment experience, fund companies, 
and size of investments of each interviewee to their views and opinions.    
 
5.2 Analysis of the Interview Data 
In analyzing the interview data, I used both the inductive and the abductive process. In the 
inductive process the analysis is driven by the empirical material (Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2008). 
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Patterns and interrelationships are found by a thorough analysis of the data. In abduction, the 
researcher has theoretical frameworks that he seeks to verify through the research data. 
 
I started the analysis process by carefully transcribing every interview. After reading through 
the material three times, I categorized the interview data into the seven themes mentioned in 
Section 5.1. The categorization was done to aide in finding patterns and themes from the large 
quantity of data, to help analyze the results of this study on each specific theme, and to 
compare the results of this study on each topic with past studies. I made no further 
codification of the data, as I did not think it would have brought any new information or aided 
the analysis process in other ways. 
 
After categorizing the data, I interpreted the data in two ways to come up with conclusions. 
Firstly, I analyzed the data to find patterns of behavior or ideas. Secondly, I compared the data 
to the results of past studies on mutual fund investor behavior and behavioral literature.  
 
In describing the data, I aimed to include enough contextual information to help in 
understanding the circumstances of the interviewees, while an opposing aim was to keep the 
description brief and focused on facts. Hirsjärvi and Hurme (2008) discuss two forms of 
description, thick and thin. Thick description aims at an in-depth and comprehensive 
description of the phenomenon, while thin description is focused merely on facts. The method 
of description used here is mostly thin. The quotes presented in the findings are translated 
from Finnish with the utmost care taken to preserve the original meaning of the interviewee. 
While many studies tie and compare the results to past studies in the concluding discussion, I 
incorporated past studies to the analysis as the data and results are introduced. This was done 
to provide a clearer picture of the qualitative analysis process.  
 
5.3 Assessing the Research and its Limitations 
As I chose the semi-structured qualitative interview method for this study, I essentially turned 
my back on any notions of statistical validity. The sample size of ten investors means that the 
study does not have much external validity as far as finding patterns of investor behavior or 
general beliefs is concerned. The aim of the study was to raise questions and point to 
important individual decision tendencies, which could later be studied with methods more 
suitable for external validity. Also, one of the study’s goals was to indicate possible problems 
30 
 
in the validity of previous studies, which can be achieved even without a large enough sample 
size for statistical validity as the analysis will show. 
 
The reliability of the findings is based on three things. Firstly, the interviewees were at ease, 
enthusiastic about the subject, were explicitly promised that they would remain anonymous 
and all seemed to freely divulge their opinions and attitudes regarding mutual fund investing. 
I have no reason to doubt that the information they disclosed was how they truly viewed their 
decision making process. However, there is naturally no way to be absolutely sure of this. One 
of the reasons for a lack of uprightness could be that not everyone is comfortable discussing 
personal finance issues, especially the bad choices they have made. However, since they all 
freely agreed to the interview, it is reasonable to assume this not to be the case. Also, the 
discussions revealed a considerable number of less than optimal investment decisions, which 
provides backing for the premise that they did divulge their opinions freely. Secondly, great 
care was taken to make sure the quality of the data remained high throughout the process, 
from recording to transcription to analysis. Thirdly, I endeavored to keep my own opinions 
from affecting responses. I did this by keeping the questions neutral and as open-ended as 
possible and by attempting to hide emotions such as surprise during the interviews.  
 
As the research is limited to Finnish investors, one should be careful when using its 
conclusions in discussing investors of other economies. As was established in Chapter 2, the 
Finnish mutual fund industry is in its early stages compared to many economies. Also, the 
prevalence of banks in Finnish retail investors’ investment activities is bound to affect their 
views and investments to a great extent, which is likely not the case for example in the United 
States. Therefore, the views of Finnish investors can substantially differ from those of 
investors in other economies. 
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6. Findings 
In Section 6.1 I will first describe the fund choosing process of each individual investor as 
they liberally described it. I asked the investors to freely go through the process of how they 
made their investments, and these descriptions are mostly derived from these answers. There 
were some follow-up questions, but the discussion at this point was mostly directed by the 
interviewee. The issues I specifically wanted to examine, and which I made sure to ask 
specific questions about, will be mostly discussed in sections 6.2 through 6.7. These issues are 
past returns, advertising, fund fees, beating the market, thoughts on and attitudes toward index 
investing, and risk attitudes. These issues will only be discussed in Section 6.1 if the 
interviewee described them without me specifically asking about them. That is, if they clearly 
recalled and mentioned them being significant factors in the decision process.  
 
The interviewees will be named Investors A through K, omitting the I, so that the name does 
not get confused with pronoun ‘I’. Comparison to past studies is done in conjunction with the 
findings, which is often the case in qualitative research, and not only in the concluding 
discussions. I felt the reasoning behind the comparisons and analysis was easier to follow in 
this way. 
 
6.1 The Fund Choosing Process 
6.1.1 Investor A 
Investor A’s fund choosing process started when her bank’s loan advisor suggested that she 
could start investing for retirement at the same time as arranging her mortgage the bank. The 
investment decision was so tied to the mortgage deal that she never considered other fund 
companies. She got a time for an investment advisor at the bank and the advisor explained the 
fund characteristics and risks, so that she could come up with her own decisions. Since she 
knew that she was investing for the long-term, she was told that she could put her money into 
riskier instruments. She then decided she would invest in both risky and less risky funds.   
 
The focus of the stock holdings of the mutual funds had a large influence on her fund choice. 
As she wanted to invest in a fund that focused on her industry, one choice was simple. She 
also bought shares in a medical fund as she thought it was a rising sector. As a safer choice 
she decided to invest in a fund focused on European stocks. To diversify her geographic risk 
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she also bought a fund investing in Japanese stock. All these fund choices were made after 
hearing the advisor going through the basics of the funds, after which she made her own 
decisions. 
 
Investor A stated that she trusted the investment advisor’s counsel. Therefore, the investment 
decision process was rather straightforward for her. Based on the advisor’s descriptions of 
fund characteristics she had clear ideas of what she wanted, and quickly made her fund 
choices.   
 
6.1.2 Investor B 
The first time investor B invested in stock mutual funds was when he had a substantial 
amount of spare money after a real estate transaction. The investments are not for any specific 
purpose such as retirement, and he could take the money out at any point. He went to an 
investment advisor at his bank to discuss possible mutual fund options. The advisor’s role in 
choosing the funds was letting investor B know all the options the bank had available.  
 
Investor B explained that even though the advisor was present to help with details, the choice 
of funds was largely his. Firstly, he wanted a well-diversified fund portfolio. Secondly, he 
wanted to invest in bold and growing markets such as Russia, China and India, as he reasoned 
he needed to be a part of those if he wanted high growth. He picked a basic Finnish fund to 
add a safer option into the portfolio. These ideas were in part shaped by the information he 
had gained from continuously following economic news, and also by doing comparisons of 
funds from newspaper comparisons. While he trusted the expertise of advisors, he believed 
they have incentives to push certain products, so he wanted to make his own decisions to a 
large extent.    
 
6.1.3 Investor C 
Investor C made his stock fund investments some five years ago partly as an experiment, as 
he wanted to see how mutual funds work. Similar to investors A and B, he also made his fund 
purchases at his bank. He reasoned that as his investments were fairly small there was really 
no point in comparing fund companies. Also, he didn’t want to pay any fees to another 
company. 
33 
 
 
He didn’t really listen to the investment advisor, as the advisor wanted to discuss investing in 
both stocks and bonds to diversify away some of the risk, while he wanted to invest purely in 
stock in order to achieve higher earnings. As he follows the economic media in his work, he 
had noticed that the developing markets had been touted a lot: He decided to see if he could 
gain some quick earnings from investing in them. He stated that the decision to invest in three 
funds focused on Russian, Indian, and Chinese holdings was a rather easy one. He was not 
interested in Finnish funds, as the market was doing well and the prices were high in his 
opinion, so the earnings forecasts were low. 
 
6.1.4 Investor D 
Investor D started his fund investments in 1999, when he was contacted by a brokerage 
company. While he didn’t have any past experience in mutual fund investments, he had clear 
ideas about what he wanted. Firstly, from the beginning, he knew that the investments were 
done for the long haul, so the investment vehicles needed to adhere to that. Secondly, he 
wanted returns that were higher than those offered by a bank account, so his target returns for 
the long term were, and are, 6-8 percent p.a. Thirdly, he wanted the investment process to be 
rather effortless.  
 
From the start, the advice and services offered by the investment advisor and the fund 
company have been very important for investor D. At the time of his original investment, he 
was also contacted by another fund company, but he found their options more difficult to fully 
comprehend than at the company he ended up investing with. The basic process was that he 
told the advisor how much returns and at what risk he wanted. And, as he wanted stable long-
term returns of 6-8 percent p.a., the advisor suggested a fund that invests in mostly large 
company stock that offer stable returns. The main rule has been that this fund contains 80 
percent of his investments, while he seeks higher returns from riskier funds with the other 20 
percent. He has so far tried to achieve these higher returns through funds investing in Far East 
markets. He doesn’t consider these funds as important, however, as he is mainly looking for 
steady long-term growth.  
 
Investor D meets with the advisor biannually or annually to discuss developments. It is at 
these meetings that he decides on additional investments. He also describes his current 
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situation at these meetings. For example, if he wants to receive a higher return with a part of 
the funds, they discuss what the alternatives for achieving it are. Mainly this is done by 
discussing how the current pot is divided between the different funds. At times they also 
discuss what new funds could achieve his goals. However, they do not really make many 
changes based on market movements. Investor D believes that a small investor is always a 
little bit late in trying to take advantage of market movements. They have discussed bigger 
changes more during significant downturns, but fund transfers have not had an important role 
as he is looking for steady long-term returns.  
 
Investor D is an example of a fund investor largely reliant on the investment advisor for his 
fund choices. He has basic ideas, and the investment advisor suggests funds and allocations 
that specifically fit those ideas. He has been largely satisfied with the service he has received, 
as it enables him to change the allocation to fit his needs rather freely, without it requiring 
much research by him. The investment advice has been so important to him that he has in fact 
considered changing fund companies after his long-term advisor changed companies a couple 
of years ago.  
 
6.1.5 Investor E 
Investor E was already an experienced stock investor when he made his mutual fund 
investments in the year 2000. He had always invested in stocks of companies that he could 
thoroughly investigate, which meant he had always invested in the stock of Finnish 
companies. At this moment in time, however, he had been thinking about investing in 
biotechnology, as it was a field he expected to offer high returns as it was to substantially 
grow in the near future. At the same time he reasoned that Asian markets were high growth 
markets, so also made the decision to invest in them. He thought of these investment targets 
as a way to further diversify his already substantial stock portfolio. Unlike the Finnish 
companies he had invested in before, he knew he could not satisfactorily investigate the 
international biotechnology companies and Asian companies. He also knew that it would be 
difficult to enter these markets by making stock investments directly. He decided that mutual 
funds were a reasonable way to invest in them, as he could rely on the research of a full-time 
fund manager.  
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Once he saw an advertisement for a biotechnology fund he went in and purchased shares in it. 
At the same time, he also invested in an Asian market fund. Investment advisors had no 
influence on his choices. He admitted that these two fund choices were made largely by using 
intuition. Investor E has been very unsatisfied with the mutual fund investment decision. Past 
experience has shown him that he can achieve higher returns by investing directly into stock, 
so he hasn’t considered making additional mutual fund investments.  
 
6.1.6 Investor F 
Investor F began her stock fund investments a year ago, when the bank she considers her 
investment bank offered a higher rate of return for a deposit, if it was matched by an equal 
sized mutual fund investment. Her regular bank account and loans are at another bank, but as 
that bank’s level and quality of service is much lower, she conducts all her investments at the 
bank discussed here. From the start of the interview, it was clear that the services offered by 
the fund company are very important to her. 
 
She had spare money from a real estate deal and went to see an investment advisor at her 
investment bank to see what options were available to her. The investment was not made with 
any specific purpose in mind. The advisor surveyed her risk tolerance and expectations and 
the process progressed from there. She wanted to avoid high risk funds, so decided to 
concentrate her fund investments in the Nordic countries, as she reasoned they would be more 
stable during uncertain times. She accepted that, as stock funds, they did have substantial risk, 
but wanted to stay away from even higher risk funds such as ones investing in Asia or Brazil. 
The geographic make-up of the funds was the only part that really mattered to her. The size, 
industry, or other nature of the companies held by the funds was not important. She does pay 
attention to financial news, but it hasn’t had an effect on her investment choices so far. She 
does expect that to change as she is currently looking to invest more money. 
 
She tried to contact other fund companies as well, but quickly grew tired of their lazy 
responses, and the prompt service she received from her investment bank was ultimately the 
deciding factor for choosing them. She declared her exasperation on how difficult it is to 
receive good service in Finland for her type of young high-income investor, who doesn’t yet 
have large sums of money to invest. Apparently, the best service is only reserved for the 
investors with high current investments without any consideration for who are likely to be the 
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big investors of tomorrow. She doesn’t consider the basic investment advice offered at banks 
real advice, as they don’t really take a comprehensive view of the client’s situation. She does 
her business were her business is appreciated and she is treated accordingly.         
 
6.1.7 Investor G 
Investor G made his mutual fund purchases between 1996 and 2006. The stock funds are in a 
retirement account, which he purchased from an insurance company after comparing the 
offerings and fee structures of several companies. From the beginning he has looked at the 
investment from a portfolio point of view, in which good diversification has been the main 
issue. He has created a balanced portfolio with as diverse funds as possible that do not 
correlate with each other. As diversification was the main issue in his fund choice, he has 
funds that invest in different geographic regions as well as funds that invest in different 
industries. 
 
He did meet investment advisors from a couple of fund companies, but decided that he could 
make investment allocation decisions that were just as good by studying the options himself. 
He doesn’t believe that there are advisors with better or different information that would help 
in making better fund choices. He stated that if you are somewhat active and informed, you 
know that there are no tips to make easy money. As he, or the fund manager, doesn’t have 
information that everyone else in the market doesn’t have it is not possible to choose better 
than others. The best he can do is to follow well-known and well-established principles: 
Control the risk by diversifying well and then sit and wait. 
 
For the first few years he did try to make positive fund allocation changes by following 
financial news and picking winners, but has not done it since 2006. He also explained that all 
his funds have been active funds that say they are trying to beat a benchmark index, but they 
haven’t been able to consistently do so. Even so, that has not been his main concern. In 
addition to a diversified portfolio, his main issue in choosing funds has been that the funds 
and fund companies are reputable.  
 
In addition to the retirement account, until recently he also had around 10 percent of his 
mutual fund investments in riskier stock funds. They included growth funds and big value 
funds which he described as very speculative. He reasoned that he could afford to keep 10 
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percent in these riskier funds. The purchase decisions for these funds were based on feelings 
or friend’s recommendations, which he called irrational reasons. However, he has lately sold 
these funds. Investor G now fulfills his investment gambling needs by investing directly into 
Finnish and Swedish stock.   
 
6.1.8 Investor H 
Investor H began his mutual fund investments in 1997 when a client of his, who sold mutual 
funds at a bank, explained to him how mutual funds work and why it would be a good idea for 
him to invest in them to save for retirement. His initial reason for starting the monthly 
investments was that he considered himself to be very poor at saving, so this was basically 
just a way to force himself to save. It didn’t really even matter to him if the investments made 
much money or not. He was told that, as he was so young, it only made sense for him to 
invest in stock funds because, despite the ups and downs that are inevitable, investing in stock 
funds is how he would earn the most in the long term. 
 
He originally picked funds that he had an emotional connection to, so he picked something to 
do with Finland and the United States. He also picked funds in fields that he “pretended to 
know” were going to break through. He described the fund choices as very emotional. He 
never considered looking into what other fund companies had to offer. Since the initial 
purchase, he said he forgets about the funds most of the time. He checks how the funds have 
done quarterly, and the time he might make changes is usually only when he gets called in to 
see his key account service provider every two years.  
 
Investor H states that he follows financial news a little bit, but he doesn’t make decisions 
based on it, because every time he has done so, he has chosen wrong. He says that since he 
doesn’t really know what he is doing, he just keeps the investments as they are. The main 
change he is planning to make in the future is to increase the portion of less volatile 
investments as he gets older. 
 
6.1.9 Investor J  
Investor J started his mutual fund investments in 2009, when he received a substantial 
inheritance and decided to invest some of the money for the long term. He knew he wanted to 
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invest in stocks, but as he didn’t have any desire to do it himself he decided to invest in 
mutual funds. A few months earlier, he had heard a couple of his friends arguing about active 
and index investing. While it didn’t really interest him much at the time, he now remembered 
the conversation, and did some quick internet research on the issue. He wasn’t looking to 
achieve very high returns, and the lower fees of index funds were a significant factor for him. 
The most relevant information he learned, however, was that it was very difficult to predict 
which active funds would provide superior returns compared to index funds and that on 
average active funds’ returns were lower. He decided that if he was practically guaranteed to 
earn more than the average active fund investor by investing in index funds, earning what the 
index earned was good enough for him. 
 
While doing his quick research, Investor J had noticed an ad for a fund company that offered 
index funds. After this the investment choice was swift. He went in to see an investment 
advisor and picked a Finnish, European, Asian, and North American index fund. He explained 
that he didn’t want to worry about making the right choice, so just invested in all the different 
geographical areas that the company had available. He didn’t want to pick a fund from a 
certain industry, as the industry could be a bad decision. He was only interested in making 
safe choices that would earn stable returns. He didn’t want to worry about it afterwards. In 
fact, he had only checked the returns once since making the investment. He reasoned that if he 
doesn’t plan on making changes anyway, why would he want to check how the funds have 
done, as seeing how they’ve done might only make him doubt his decisions. 
 
6.1.10 Investor K       
Investor K first started investing in mutual funds in 2002, when his wages went up 
significantly as he entered a new job, and thus had more spare money each month. He had 
been thinking about starting monthly mutual fund investments, so went to his bank to discuss 
setting them up. He never considered looking at other fund company options. As he was 
mainly investing for retirement, he wanted to be able to earn stable long-term returns.  
 
He had an initial idea about diversifying his funds geographically, and after discussions with 
the financial advisor that is what he ended up doing. He started with funds investing in 
Finland, Europe, and North America, and later added funds focused in Latin America and 
Asia. He downplayed the influence of the advisor, whose role he said was merely describing 
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the funds so that he was better equipped to make a decision. Within the next few years 
investor K added an environmentally responsible mutual fund to his portfolio. It was mainly 
an emotional decision, though he did also believe that it was something that could bring high 
returns as the field grew. 
 
During the next decade, investor K paid a lot of attention to the financial media, even though 
he didn’t make any changes based on market movements. His investments were for the long 
term, and he didn’t believe you could actually time the market in any case. However, the 
attention he paid to financial news did eventually change his investment strategy. He read 
several articles about the performance of active mutual funds against index funds, and ended 
up doing his own research on the matter as well. Most of the evidence he read about pointed 
to the fact that active funds mostly perform worse than indexes. He originally found the 
evidence very surprising, as his own active funds had been performing very well. Two of his 
funds had beaten the benchmark index, while three had lost. However, the Finnish fund had 
beaten the index so convincingly that as a portfolio his funds had beaten their benchmark 
indexes during the time he had owned them. Yet, he says he found the evidence for passive 
investing very convincing. He realized that there will always be some winners, even if they 
could not be winners consistently, and eventually started to believe that even his highly 
successful Finnish fund was perhaps just one of the lucky ones. 
 
While he believed that the index strategy was the preferable one, he didn’t make changes to 
his portfolio for a few years, as he wasn’t looking to change fund companies. That changed in 
the fall of 2011, when his bank started to offer index funds for retail investors. He transferred 
his European, American, and Asian funds to the index equivalents, and started to invest in the 
Nordic Countries index fund. As he still feels strongly about the environment, he is still 
investing in the environmental active fund, as there was no index equivalent for it available at 
his bank. 
 
He still invests in the Finnish fund. This is partly because the bank doesn’t offer a Finnish 
index fund. The rest of his reasoning was revealing about the emotional side of investing: 
 I pretty much know that past performance doesn’t really mean anything. But the 
thing is, if they did offer a Finnish index fund, I can’t be really sure I’d go with it. 
Well, instead of the active fund. It’s been so good to me I don’t know if I could get 
away from it. And, well, the Nordic fund would give me enough Finnish stock 
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anyway on its own. It’s not logical, but I’m going to keep the active fund for a bit 
of a gamble, even though I’m not looking to gamble with these investments. I’m 
regretting it a bit anyway, already, because the fund’s been losing to the index 
since I made the changes. And to the Nordic fund as well.      
 
6.1.11 Summary and Analysis of the Fund Choosing Process 
In analyzing the interview data, I placed significant emphasis on information that the 
interviewees provided without specific questions regarding decision factors. For example, if 
an interviewee didn’t mention past returns affecting their decision, I placed more importance 
on factors, such as the geographic location of fund holdings, which they mentioned without 
prompting. As it is, when freely discussing their fund choice, not one interviewee described 
past returns as having an effect on their decision. As will be seen in Section 6.4, past returns 
did have an influence on the decisions of some of the investors, but clearly past returns were 
not as important a factor as the ones mentioned in this section, as they were only mentioned 
when specifically asked about. 
 
Perhaps the most important finding of these interviews is that most investors choose the first 
fund company that offers their services to them. Only investor G researched and compared 
fund companies prior to the investment. Five of the investors invested with the bank they had 
done business with before, without looking at other options. Two investors invested with the 
company whose advertisement first fit their needs. Two investors purchased their mutual 
funds at the first company that contacted them about mutual fund investments. It seems 
reasonable to deduce that many retail investors do not think that the performance of mutual 
fund companies differs from company to company. However, a quick research of companies 
would reveal to them that supposedly similar funds at different companies differ greatly in 
terms of fee structure, risk profile, stock holdings and returns. Also, the services provided by 
fund companies vary significantly.  
 
While being the default option was the most important factor in deciding fund companies, the 
nature of the stock holdings of the fund was the most important factor in deciding between 
funds within a fund company. It is important to note that nine of the interviewees did not 
compare similar funds from different fund companies based on factors such as past 
performance or fee structure. Examining those factors has been the focus of past studies such 
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as Jäntti (2005) and Capon et al. (1996). If an investor was to choose between two Finnish 
growth funds offered by two Finnish fund companies, the decision factors examined by Jäntti 
and Capon et al. would be relevant. However, the results of this study suggest decisions such 
as described above are not relevant to many retail investors. Many investors simply choose to 
invest at their bank and then decide which of their funds fit their needs. The most important 
deciding factor in choosing funds at this point was the industry or geographic location of the 
companies whose stock the fund held. 
 
The results of this study suggest that the questionnaire studies by Jäntti (2005) and Capon et 
al. (1996) were unable to get to the bottom of all the decision factors of retail mutual fund 
investors. For example, they did not ask whether the investors simply chose the default fund 
company. As discussed in the previous paragraph, an affirmative answer to this question 
would have likely rendered many of the other factors insignificant. Also, they didn’t ask 
whether the most important factor in choosing specific funds was the geographic location or 
industry of the fund’s holdings. While Jäntti’s questionnaire didn’t include this issue at all in 
the question that resulted in past performance being the most important factor, Capon’s et al. 
questionnaire listed investment management style as one of the nine factors studied. It is 
possible that many respondents did not realize that the fund management style includes issues 
such as the industry of the fund holdings. This would likely show a faulty result due to the 
framing of the question. Overall, due to the limited format of questionnaires, the options 
probably leave out many factors that could be the most important for the investment choice. 
As a consequence, some factors could be overrated.  
 
Even though the interviewees in this study, in replying to Jäntti’s questionnaire, rated 
independent fund ratings as the second most important factor in choosing mutual funds, not 
one of them mentioned fund ratings during the interviews. It is reasonable to assume that if 
they had in fact compared fund ratings and that the ratings had an effect on their decisions, 
they would have mentioned them. The interviewees were presented with the following 
question (appendix 3), which was also used in Jäntti’s (2006) study: “What is the most 
important criterion for selection, when you choose a mutual fund?” “Independent fund 
ratings” sounds like a very logical and reasonable answer to the question, even if the 
respondent had never seen such ratings. The respondent could be likely to rate it as a more 
important factor than factors which have actually had an influence on the fund choice merely 
because it sounds like a better answer. Jäntti’s questionnaire is thus likely to overrate the 
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importance of independent fund ratings. This could be perhaps avoided by framing the 
question differently. This could, for example, be done by adding the following to the above 
question: “Only rate factors that you truly considered when you made your fund choice; give 
all other factors the lowest rating, even if they are good choices in your opinion.”  
 
One factor that could explain why independent fund ratings did not receive more importance 
in this study could be the fact that six of the interviewees purchased their mutual funds 
through their banks. Knuutila et al. (2007) found that fund ratings affect investor decision 
making mainly for investors who do not invest through banks. Therefore, according to their 
findings, only four of the interviewees in this study were likely to consider fund ratings to 
start with.  
  
For most of the investors, the role of the investment adviser was that of an information 
provider, while the investors maintained that the choice was mostly theirs. The investors 
relied largely on their own research, knowledge of industries and expectations of development 
in geographic areas to choose funds that they were either familiar with or that they expected 
to have high growth. Only investor D indicated that the fund choice was mostly guided by the 
adviser based on his situation and requirements. 
 
Three of the investors admitted that emotion had a large part to play in choosing some of their 
funds. The need to gamble was also mentioned. It goes to show that the entertainment value 
of investments certainly has and influence on decision making.  
 
6.2 Advertising 
The findings of this study suggests that advertising can be one of the most important factors in 
the mutual fund investment decisions of some investors, even though past studies conducted 
by questionnaires or interviews have suggested their influence is minimal. It is reasonable to 
assume that interviewing is not likely to be the best way to find out how much advertisement 
affects investment decisions, since people might be willing to downplay its importance to 
emphasize what they consider rational reasons for their decisions. That is if they are able to 
recall the effect of advertising at all. Still, I found that in some cases advertisement can be an 
integral part of the decision making process. 
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As was discussed in Section 6.1, investor E stated that prior to his first mutual fund 
investment he had been considering investing in biotechnology companies. Once he saw a 
newspaper advertisement concerning the first biotechnology fund in Finland, he went in soon 
after and invested in the fund. Other than his preference for biotechnology stock, the 
advertisement was practically the only factor behind his fund choice. He didn’t compare past 
returns, fees or fund ratings. The advertisement simply fit his need and the decision was 
made. Investors C and J were the other two interviewees who recalled advertising impacting 
their decision. They also revealed that the advertisement fit a pre-existing need. Investor C 
did, however, consider many other factors as well before settling on the advertised fund. As 
the mutual fund investment decision is such a complex one, it seems that advertisement is 
most effective when it is preaching to the converted. It is difficult to create a need, when the 
specific need is so multifaceted. However, once a need is already established, the lower search 
costs due to advertising become important.  
 
The rest of the interviewees simply dismissed the possibility of advertisement having any 
impact on their decision at all. This is in line with Jäntti’s (2005) study carried out with 
questionnaires, in which advertisement was the least important fund choice factor. How do we 
explain the difference between these results and the results of some of the other studies (see 
Section 3.2) which studied the impact of advertisement on investor behavior by analyzing 
actual market data, and which found that advertisement has a significant impact? Naturally, 
for advertisement to have a clear effect on fund flows, it does not need to be one of the most 
important investment decision factors. Even if it affects the decisions of a mere 10 percent of 
investors, it could easily have an observable impact on fund flows. Also, my narrow data set 
suggests that e.g. Jäntti’s questionnaire tends to understate the importance of advertising. 
When filling out Jäntti’s questionnaire a week after the interview, investor E rated 
advertisement as the least important factor for his fund choice, even though the interview 
revealed the complete opposite. It seems that the framing of the questionnaire greatly affects 
the answers. The other two interviewees discussed above also rated advertisement as the least 
important factor in the questionnaire, which was in complete contrast to how they described 
their fund choosing process. 
 
The interviewee’s attitude towards mutual fund advertising was mostly indifferent. However, 
without prompting investor C stated that “banks … have a big incentive to sell the products 
that have the best margins.” Investor K expressed the most negative view of advertising, when 
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he said that fund companies only push the funds that have happened to perform well in the 
near past. He added that the funds that did well even a year or two ago are probably not 
mentioned at all, which he thinks shows that the companies are not really advertising so called 
good funds, but that they are in effect advertising funds that had just happened to be lucky at 
the moment.  
 
6.3 Costs of Funds 
The interviewee’s indifference towards and lack of knowledge on fee structures were striking. 
Of the eight investors who invested solely in active funds, six admitted to not knowing the fee 
structure of their funds, while the remaining two were the only ones who in any way 
compared the fees of individual funds when making the investment decision. Even for these 
two the size of fees was not one of the most significant factors. The prevailing attitude 
amongst most of the interviewees, at the time they made their investments, was that the fees 
were insignificant and would not affect returns much. One interviewee’s statement summed 
up the attitude: “It had a maintenance fee of some kind, but I didn’t find it substantial in any 
way.” As the issue is completely different for the two index fund investors, J and K, I will 
discuss them separately. 
 
Investors A, B and D stated that since the original investment decision, they had already 
changed their attitudes towards fees. They had found out from published fund comparisons 
and news articles that the fees of funds could vary to a great extent, and admitted that they 
should have compared the fee structures of funds when making the investment decision. 
However, they still couldn’t describe the fee structure of their own funds.  
 
Investors F and H largely dismissed the importance of fees at the beginning of the interview. 
However, once they checked their maintenance fees during the interview, their attitudes 
towards them changed immediately. Before checking, Investor F stated that the funds haven’t 
charged her a yearly maintenance fee. When I pointed out that they probably deduct it directly 
from the returns, she checked her fund company’s website and went through the following 
revealing thought process: “The maintenance fee is apparently 1.85 percent. That is 
substantial yearly. It is not especially mentioned here in any way. This is really quite 
interesting.” And then, after reading from the website the words “The ratio of total fees to…” 
she went on to conclude that the fee structure “has been made difficult.” After this, her 
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attitude towards fees changed radically. The fact that investors make large investment 
decisions whilst not knowing substantial and fundamental facts about their investment choices 
is alarming. It is clear that at least some investment advisers do not make it clear enough to 
investors how big an effect fees can have on fund performance, and that the fees can vary 
significantly between funds.  
 
The reality that six of the interviewees didn’t consider fee structures at all when making their 
investment decision is even more interesting when we consider the fact that not one of them 
believe there is a positive relationship between higher fees and higher returns. Surely, if one 
believes that higher fees do not relate to higher returns, one should look for the funds with the 
lowest fees. That the interviewees did not do so can be explained by their lack of knowledge 
on the issue. As they didn’t know their own funds’ fee structures, the fees’ significant effect 
on fund returns, and the substantial differences between funds, they didn’t really have the 
knowledge required to start comparing funds. It is interesting to note that investor G, who was 
most aware of the importance of fee structure, emphasized how important it was for him that 
changes between funds were free for them. The fund company was able to put a positive spin 
on the fee structure.  
 
The above results are largely in agreement with the results of past studies described in Section 
3.2. As investors are largely indifferent to fund fees, it is not a surprise that fees do not have a 
large effect on fund flows. The data gathered by Capon et al. (1996) also provided similar 
results as the interview data in this study, as did Alexander’s et al. (1998) study. Therefore, the 
only study with significantly differing results was Jäntti’s (2005) study, which found that fund 
costs were the second most important factor in making fund choices. It is again interesting to 
note that when I used Jäntti’s questionnaire for my small sample, the results were similar to 
his findings, even though the interviews discussed here revealed indifference towards fees 
during the investment decision. However, this can be explained by the fact that some of the 
interviewees’ attitudes had already changed after the investment decision, and also by the fact 
that some of the interviewees changed their attitudes after studying the fee structures of their 
funds during and after the interviews. 
 
At the time he made his original active fund investments, index investor K admitted to having 
the same lack of knowledge on fees as the investors discussed above. But, as he subsequently 
studied fund comparisons and read news articles on the issue, his attitude changed and index 
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funds became a viable option. Investor K summed up his feelings regarding fees and his 
switch to index funds: “I thought that, why am I paying these high fees for the kind of service, 
where someone is likely to make less than average decisions?” For investor J, fees were an 
important factor from the beginning.    
 
6.4 Past Performance 
Investors A, B, C, and D stated that the past returns of funds affected their fund choice. 
Investor C declared that it was in fact the most important factor in his fund choice, as he was 
looking for high returns he picked funds with high past returns. All four investors mentioned 
here indicated that they believe past returns can be used to predict the future in some ways. 
Investor A believes that if a fund has had stable growth in the past it is also likely to have 
stable growth in the future, so you can predict patterns of future earnings from past 
performance. Also, when choosing between similar funds, she believes that the fund with the 
higher past returns is much likelier to have higher future returns. Investors B and C believe 
that past returns is a measure of the fund manager’s skills, while investor B also believes that 
a fund which has been better than average in the past will also perform better than average in 
the future. Investor D believes that you can measure the stability of funds by studying past 
returns and seeing how quickly they respond to market changes. It had an important effect on 
his choices as he was looking for stability in his funds. While it didn’t really affect her fund 
choices, investor F believes that with the right expertise you can choose the funds that will 
perform best out of similar funds. Investor E believes that while past returns are not a good 
basis for predicting the future, they can be used to decide if a fund has a manager who makes 
mistakes. 
 
The other four investors do not think past returns have any predictive value for future returns. 
Investor G explained that he always checks the past performance of funds when making 
purchase decisions, but always reminds himself not to let it affect the actual decision. 
Investors H, J, and K did not even look at past returns of different funds when making their 
decisions. Investor K did, however, think that it is possible to make judgments on an active 
fund’s future performance based on the amount of transactions the fund manager makes. He 
believes that if a fund has made more stock trades compared to others, it will also do so in the 
future, and that excessive buying and selling will be harmful for the fund’s performance in the 
future. 
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While the results of this study reveal that past returns are a major factor for many investors 
when choosing mutual funds, the results suggest it is not nearly as important as has been 
suggested in past studies. Both Capon’s et al. (1996) and Jäntti’s (2005) studies, which asked 
respondents to rate the criteria for fund choice, rated past performance as the most important 
decision factor. Capon’s et al. study revealed that past performance was the most important 
factor for over half of the respondents. In this study, only investor C declared it to be the most 
important factor behind his fund choice. This could, of course, be due to the very small 
sample size of this study, and that a larger sample size would have a higher percentage of 
investors for whom past performance is the most important factor. However, I believe the 
reason is that Capon et al. and Jäntti probably didn’t ask all the relevant questions, as was 
discussed in the summary of Section 6.1.  
 
It must be said, however, that in filling out Jäntti’s questionnaire, the interviewees of this 
study rated past performance as only the third most important factor behind fees and 
independent fund ratings. So, even when answering the same questions as in previous studies, 
the results differed, meaning that the differences could be explained by the limited sample 
size. However, this does not explain why factors such as the geographic location or industry 
of the fund’s holdings were the most important for some interviewees, while the above 
mentioned studies did not even mention these factors. For three of the four interviewees that 
stated that past returns mattered in the decision, it was only one factor amongst many in the 
choice decision, and certainly not the most important.   
 
As reviewed in Section 3.1, many studies have found a positive relationship between fund 
flows and past returns. This study of the individual decision making level supports these 
findings, as four of the ten investors in this study stated that past returns had an influence on 
their choice of funds. However, the results do not seem to agree with Kasanen, Lipponen, and 
Puttonen’s (2001) findings that investors who invest in funds that are distributed through 
banks seem to know little of past performance, since a higher proportion of the investors who 
declared that past returns influenced their decisions were investors in funds distributed 
through banks than other fund providers. However, this could be explained by differences 
caused by the small sample size.  
 
48 
 
6.5 Beating the Market 
An important consideration when making investment decisions should be whether an investor 
wants to increase risk to try to achieve above average returns. That is, whether they are 
attempting to beat the market or not. The following section discusses the interviewees' 
attitudes towards beating the market. Specifically, I explore whether they think active funds 
do a good job of beating the market, whether the investors have made a conscious decision to 
try to beat the market, if they think their investments have beaten the market, and whether 
they think they have the required skills to choose funds that beat the market. Of the eight 
investors in active funds, six were able to satisfactorily explain what a benchmark index is. 
The following sections only discuss the eight active fund investors. As the index investors, 
namely investors J and K, have already invested to gain average market returns, they are a 
fundamentally different group and will be discussed separately in Section 6.5.6.  
 
6.5.1 Measuring Performance 
Most financial experts would agree that the most practical way of measuring an investment’s 
performance is to compare it to a benchmark index of the asset type in question. For example, 
if one had invested in a European equity fund, one would want to compare how the 
investment has done compared to the European equity market as a whole. Comparing the 
investment to a bond fund would not be very practical, as the bond fund has significantly 
different risk characteristics and return expectations. Of course, one could also consider 
whether the chosen asset type was a good investment compared to other asset types, but 
individual funds should be compared against similar individual funds and the appropriate 
market or market segment. Also, it is the stated objective of practically all active stock funds 
to beat the benchmark index. It follows that this is what the funds should be judged on. 
 
However, it seems the above reasoning is not as obvious for the retail investor. Out of the 
eight active fund investors, only investor G stated that he uses market indexes to judge the 
performance of his stock funds. He stated that in addition to comparing the separate funds to 
their benchmark indexes, he also compares his overall fund portfolio to major geographic 
stock market indexes. Also, he does this comparison for the lifetime of the funds, not for 
shorter time periods. 
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Investor B said that he compares his funds’ returns to those of other similar funds. He didn’t 
consider it his goal to have the best possible fund, but certainly not the worst either, and by 
comparing funds he is able to judge whether his returns are in the frame he aspires. When 
asked about market indexes, he said that he hasn’t compared his funds to index returns, 
because he has “the information and understanding that even a fool can get market index 
returns.” However, it is reasonable that he should compare how his investments have 
compared to the returns that a ‘fool’ can achieve. 
 
The other six active fund investors did not consider market returns or other funds in judging 
how their funds have performed. Investors A, E, F, and H simply compared the current value 
of their investments to the amount they originally invested. The more above the original 
investment they are, the better the fund performance has been. They didn’t have an objective 
return target in mind, so how they view their investments is likely to be somewhat 
inconsistent. Also, they could be holding the fund with the best long-term returns and best 
current performance compared to other similar funds, yet could be very unsatisfied with their 
fund choice due to a general decline in the stock markets. Similarly, they could be very happy 
with their investments in a bull market, while any number of similar investments could be 
earning a higher return. It is a problem if many investors do not know the right tools for 
judging their investments, as it means that the fund market could be far from efficient. 
Significant funds could erroneously go to fund managers who achieve negative results 
compared to average funds.  
 
Investors C and D had a specific target return for their investments, 10 percent and 6 percent 
p.a. respectively and only considered the success of their investment choices compared to the 
set target return. This approach has the same problems as the approach discussed in the above 
paragraph. It does seem odd that investors A, C, D, E, F, and H are not interested in whether 
they could have made better choices or whether they could make better choices going 
forward. Logically, the only time investors A, E, F, and H would likely consider changing 
their investments is if they produced negative returns, and even then the change wouldn’t take 
into account how the fund had performed against other similar funds. Similarly, Investors C 
and D would only be likely to consider changing their investments if they failed to achieve 
their target returns, which could be very arbitrary for their chosen funds.  
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6.5.2 Do Active Funds Beat the Indexes? 
Of the eight active fund investors, only investors A, E and F thought that active funds on 
average beat their benchmark indexes. Investor A explained the common sense rationale for 
her opinion:  
I think, that if there is an index, and the alternative is an active fund, where an 
expert forecasts and looks at what is worth investing in, that of course the 
expertise of the fund manager beats that kind of average return. 
 
The logic of this line of thinking is, on the face of it, so sound that it is surprising that five of 
the other active fund investors do not share it. Since fund managers are paid for their 
expertise, it seems very illogical to think that they would not beat the average.   
 
Of the interviewees skeptical of fund manager performance, investor B said his opinion was 
based on articles in economic newspapers, which stated that active funds do a poor job against 
the market. Interviewee G explained that he believes that the costs of gaining better 
information than what the market has are larger than the gains from being able to make better 
than average decisions based on this information. Investor C based his belief in his own 
experiences, as his funds had performed much worse than their bench mark indexes. Investor 
D said he thinks that fund managers look at the situation from so close that they react to all 
changes, and thus lose in the trades by making too many changes. The most interesting case 
was investor H, who in effect changed his opinion during his answer, because he had not 
really thought the issue through before. The following words were said without an 
interruption from the interviewer:  
It makes sense that active funds would beat the indexes. I guess I believe that 
some do and some don't, and if you pick one that does, you can really beat the 
market return, if you're lucky. So it's more fun from that perspective. But I guess if 
you really ask me what I think, if you take all the active funds and average them 
together, it would be pretty much the same as the indexes, but then you have the 
fees, active funds are more expensive, so I guess it's a bit stupid.  
 
The fact that he is changing his mind about active investing only because he is asked to think 
about it, reveals that he has made investment decisions without considering some of the most 
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important issues. A relevant question from a paternalistic viewpoint is whether it should be 
the responsibility of investment advisors to make sure that customers think about these issues 
when making decisions involving large sums of money. 
 
6.5.3 Did They Decide to Beat the Market?  
Only three of the interviewees had made a conscious decision to try to achieve above market 
average returns with at least a portion of their funds. Of them, Investor G had completely 
changed his attitude since then, and from this point forward would be happy with index 
returns. Investor B explained that even though he would be happy with average returns, he 
wanted to invest in active funds as “a sort of side bet”. While his decision to beat the market 
was not as clear cut, Investor D had used a small portion of his investments to pick funds that 
were attempting very high returns, so was partly attempting to beat the market as well. 
However, he had invested the lion’s share in funds that were trying to achieve stable market 
returns. 
 
The other investors had not really thought about the issue at the time of the investment. 
Investor A explained her thinking: 
When making the investment, I didn’t think that I was trying to beat the market. 
But average returns are not enough for me, I want to gamble a little bit … The 
thought has somewhat been: Suppose I get lucky after all.  
 
This is a clear example of an investor looking for emotional benefits, as discussed in Section 
4.1.7, rather than simply thinking about maximizing returns as the rational market theory 
would expect. Her thoughts also suggest that her investment decisions have also been very 
much affected by over optimism. Investor B’s description of active funds as a “sort of side 
bet” also suggests the presence of gambling. Investor C explained, that even though he had 
not made a conscious decision to beat the market, he would not be happy with average market 
returns, unless they are above his goal of 10 percent yearly returns. While he didn’t believe 
active funds on average beat the market, he reasoned that the only way for him to be able to 
earn his target return was to invest in riskier active funds.  
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Thinking about the issue for the first time during the interview, investor F wanted higher than 
average returns with a part of his portfolio, while she would be happy with market returns 
with the rest. Even after thinking about the issue, Investor E didn’t really consider market 
returns as a relevant subject. His only concern was finding funds that invest in interesting 
markets. As discussed in the previous section, investor H changed his views during the 
interview, because he hadn’t thought about the issue before. So, he had not decided to beat the 
market when investing, but was leaning towards accepting average returns when thinking 
about the subject during the interview. 
 
6.5.4 “Have I Been Beating the Market?” 
I asked the eight active fund investors whether their funds had beaten their benchmark 
indexes. Investors A, B, and H stated that they believed their funds had beaten their 
benchmark indexes. To see whether these beliefs were based in fact or not, I looked at the 
long term fund returns for each fund compared to their benchmark indexes. I looked at the 
longest term data I could find for each fund. I did not evaluate whether the funds are using the 
appropriate benchmark indexes, merely how they are performing in relation to their stated aim 
of beating said market indexes.  
 
Three of Investor A’s four funds had significantly underperformed the index in the last 10 
years, while one had almost exactly the same return as the index. One of Investor B’s funds 
had beaten its benchmark by much more than the other had lost to its benchmark index, so he 
was justified in thinking his funds were beating the market. Of Investor H’s six funds only 
one had beaten its benchmark index. Investors A and H clearly overestimated their funds’ 
performances. As they had never considered measuring the performance of their funds against 
the market index, they had no basis for their belief. The fact that they considered their 
investments better than average similar investments could be due to cognitive dissonance or 
the endowment effect as discussed in Section 4.1.4.  
 
It is interesting to note that the other five active fund investors did not think their funds had 
beaten their benchmarks, even though only one of them had actually been following whether 
that was the case. The behavioral theories discussed earlier would most likely predict that 
investors overrate their own performance. Perhaps the overall poor performance of the 
markets, and thus also their funds, has caused them to feel negatively about their investments, 
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and thus they negatively rate the performance of their funds, even though they have no logical 
reason to think they’ve underperformed against the market. 
 
6.5.5 Do I Make Above Average Decisions? Why? 
As discussed in Section 6.5.3, five of the investors had decided, either when making their 
investments or while thinking about their strategy afterwards, that they wanted higher than 
average market returns. This section discusses whether the interviewees believe they have the 
knowledge and skills to choose the funds that have higher returns than their benchmark 
indexes.   
 
While investor A revealed that part of her decision to invest in active funds was a desire to 
gamble a little bit, she also believed at the time of investing that by making educated guesses 
she would be able to make better than average choices. For example, she invested in a fund 
that invests in her field of work. She reasoned that since she has a thorough knowledge of the 
field, she can make good investment decisions. However, since she didn’t compare the 
holdings of different funds in the field, it is doubtful that she could use her knowledge of the 
field to her advantage unless she had judged the whole line of business to be undervalued by 
the market. Ultimately, however, her belief that she can make above average decisions means 
it is logical for her to invest in active funds. 
 
Investor B described his active fund investments as a sort of “side bet”, but he also believes 
that by constantly studying fund comparison statistics he is able to gain an understanding of 
which funds are the good ones. He believes it would only take him 1-2 days of work each 
month to really be able to successfully choose the funds which beat the market, an amount of 
time which he has not so far used for the task.   
 
When investor H discussed whether he’d be able to pick the successful funds, he showed an 
interesting self-awareness regarding overconfidence: 
I don't think I can pick the good funds. I think it would probably take a lot of 
work, but I'm not willing to take the time to do that, and if I did, I think the 
place to invest would be directly into the stock market. I think I could be just as 
smart as the fund managers and then I wouldn't be paying them to do it, the 
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fees. I think if I really applied myself I could beat the market. But that's 
probably ridiculous as well, because everyone thinks they can.   
 
Investor C didn’t think he could currently pick the winning funds. However, he did think that 
if he actively studied the fund market, he could pick funds that perform above the market 
average. In his estimation, it would take a few hours a month to be able to find the winning 
funds, but as his investments were so small, he didn’t think it was worth the effort.  
 
Investors D and F did not think they have the knowledge and skills to pick the winning funds, 
but both have tried to do so by relying on the expertise of investment advisers. Investor E 
didn’t think that he could choose a fund that would beat its benchmark index, but did think he 
could pick a stock fund type that would perform better than average. An interesting aspect of 
his fund investment experience is that as the funds plunged much lower in 2001 than his 
original purchase price, he decided that he would wait until they came back to even and then 
sell them, which he did when it finally happened. At the same time he was making much 
larger profits in his direct stock investments, and said he believed that the fund investments 
had lower earnings expectations than his stock investments. The rational decision model 
would suggest that the logical choice would be to sell the lower quality investments and 
purchase higher quality investments to maximize returns. Why then keep hold of investments 
that he knew to be lower quality? This behavior can be explained by the disposition effect, 
which was discussed in Section 4.1.2.  
 
Investor G explained his thinking on his fund picking skills as follows: 
I don’t believe I can choose funds that beat their indexes. You can save a lot by 
doing the groundwork not to make awful choices. That you only choose 
trustworthy fund companies and large trustworthy funds and stay away from 
speculative and shady funds. In that way you can weed out those unnecessary 
losses. But to be able to choose the winners, well no one else knows how to do 
that either.    
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that only A, B, and C believed they have the ability to 
pick winners if they put some effort into the task. Whether it is possible to forecast which 
funds will be winners in the future is an ongoing matter of debate in the finance community. 
However, according to the current and well-accepted understanding of market behavior, 
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investors A, B, and C displayed no reasons for their fund picking skills that stand up to 
scrutiny. Simply picking a fund in the field of one’s employment, especially without 
comparing similar funds, will not predict a winning performance. Most academics would 
agree that it is not possible to merely study past performances of funds to be able to choose 
winning funds for the future. If consistently picking winners is in fact possible, it would take a 
more comprehensive analysis of fund holdings and strategies than explained by these 
investors. The fact that these investors believe it could be so easily done could be down to two 
reasons. One reason could be overconfidence in one’s abilities. Perhaps as likely a reason is 
the investor’s lack of knowledge on the mechanics of financial markets.  
 
It is possible that if some of the investors who did not believe in their fund picking skills had 
had abnormally good returns in recent years, they would have been more inclined to rate their 
ability to pick winners higher. This would be due to a bias caused by the representativeness 
heuristic discussed in Section 4.1.1. They could incorrectly attribute the abnormally good 
returns to their own skills while ignoring the base probability that abnormally good returns are 
likely to happen at some point for any fund. In fact, investor E showed this tendency in his 
belief that he could do better than professional fund managers based on the fact that his 
individual stock investments had significantly outperformed the market and his mutual fund 
investments. This, even though he didn’t put hours of analysis into the stock picks. In any 
case, for investors A, B, and C, their belief in their winner picking skills seemingly had no 
relation to how their funds had performed.      
 
6.5.6 Index Investors and Beating the Market 
As could be logically expected, the two index fund investors, Investors J and K, had no 
intention of beating the market. However, as Investor K still has one active fund, he correctly 
compares its performance to that of its benchmark index. They believe that active funds 
mostly lose to index funds. Both are happy with average market returns less the low fees they 
are paying, and do not think they would be able to pick superior active funds. 
 
6.6 Thoughts on and Attitudes toward Index Investing 
Of the eight active fund investors, only two were able to explain what passive investing and 
index funds mean. The two investors who were able to give a definition for these concepts, 
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investors E and G were also two of the most experienced investors. Even though index 
investing has grown rapidly in Finland recently, especially amongst retail investors as 
reviewed in Section 2.4, it seems that most investors are not aware of the different basic 
investment strategies available to them. When considering the following results, it is 
important to note that I did not discuss the findings of Section 2.2, “The Arguments for 
Passive and Active Investing”, with the interviewees. I merely gave them a basic definition of 
index funds and that they aim to follow the returns of market indexes and generally have 
lower fees than active funds.   
 
Of the six investors who did not previously, to a large extent, know what index funds are, four 
would now consider them a good investment option. Investor A would consider investing a 
part of her funds in index funds to have more stable stock funds in her portfolio. Investor D 
would invest in index funds to increase the stability of his returns, while he also believes that 
active funds perform worse than index funds. Investor F would be interested in index funds 
even though she believes active funds on average probably beat index funds. She doubts her 
own ability in choosing the winning funds, so index funds interest her. As investor H looked 
at the fee structure of his funds and also at how they had underperformed against their 
benchmarks, he became very interested in index funds. Investor B didn’t consider index funds 
an option in the future, as he is now aiming to choose individual stocks to beat the market. 
Investor C would only consider index funds if they were expected to earn 10 percent p.a.  
 
Of the investors already aware of index funds, investor E had no interest in them, as he 
believes active funds beat index funds on average. Investor G had been and is seriously 
considering investing in index funds. His fund portfolio is well diversified, but the separate 
geographical funds are losing to their benchmarks, so he is considering replacing them with 
corresponding index funds where available.   
 
In summary, it seems clear that there is a significant group of investors who would change 
their investment strategy if they were aware of the options. If four of six investors interviewed 
here become very interested in index funds merely by learning what they are, it is reasonable 
to assume that there is a very large similar group in the general public as well. Many investors 
would be happy with average returns if they only knew that there were options available that 
would give them those returns. If the evidence discussed in Section 2.2, which suggests that it 
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is hard for retail investors to find winning active funds, is further substantiated, it seems clear 
that informing retail investors more thoroughly on the options available to them is important.    
 
6.7 Risk Attitudes 
Attitudes towards risk and risk aversion in particular significantly influence the investment 
decisions of retail investors. In addition to a client’s investment goals, a client’s risk tolerance 
is the most important issue for financial advisors when making investment recommendations. 
If an investor has investments that are too risky for the investor’s attitudes towards risk, the 
investment’s volatility could cause the investor to sell the investment at an inopportune time 
and to forget about the long-term nature of the investment. At the same time, since riskier 
investments generally provide higher returns, investing in safe investments would cause a less 
risk-averse investor to be unhappy with returns.  
 
As risk attitudes should have a large influence on the fund choices of investors, I wanted to 
gain a tentative picture of the interviewees’ risk aversion. I performed two crude tests by 
presenting the interviewees with two scenarios. The questions were not designed to gain a 
definitive understanding of the risk taking characteristics of the interviewees, as that would 
require observing real life behavior. However, they should give a rather good indication of 
how risk averse the interviewees are compared to each other.  
 
Firstly, I wanted to measure the interviewees’ risk aversion in an investment setting. The 
scenario involved a choice between choosing active or passive stock funds. I asked each 
interviewee whether they would invest in active funds if they knew for a fact that 50 percent 
of active funds beat the relevant index and 50 percent do not. The scenario assumed that there 
was a similar index fund option available to them. The interviewees were then asked a follow-
up question: At what point would the percentage of active funds beating the index be so small 
that they would no longer invest in active funds, but would take the index option instead? For 
example, if only 5 percent of active funds beat their benchmark indexes, choosing an active 
fund would be much riskier than if 50 percent of funds beat the index.  
 
The answer to this question is obviously not only decided by the investor’s level of risk 
aversion, as someone with a high belief in one’s fund picking skills would be much likelier to 
58 
 
pick active funds even if fewer of them beat the indexes. Therefore, I will also take this into 
account when analyzing the answers. 
 
Secondly, I wanted to measure the interviewee’s risk aversion in a non-investment scenario. 
This scenario is similar to some tests performed to test the theories of risk and loss aversion. 
The fictional scenario involved a choice of whether the interviewee would accept the 
following bet. The bet involved tossing a coin and the interviewee guessing either heads or 
tails. If they guess correctly they win 100 euros, if they guess incorrectly they lose 100 euros. 
It was made explicitly clear for the interviewee that the bet would be offered only once and in 
their current financial situation. If the interviewee would not accept the bet, they were asked a 
follow-up question: If the amount you would lose by guessing wrong stayed the same as 
before, how much would the winnings offered have to be for you to accept the bet? Naturally, 
the higher the winnings required by the interviewee, the higher their level of risk aversion is. 
 
Table 1. shows the threshold percentages in the first scenario and required winnings in the 
second scenario for each interviewee. 
 
Interviewee: A B C D E F G H K J 
Scenario 1, (%) 40 20 25 65 20 50 30 50 50 40 
Scenario 2   (€) 10 000 500 500 100 500 200 150 100 200 120 
 
 
 
As one would logically expect, the four investors who were most against index investing, 
investors B, C, E, and G, were also the least risk-averse in the investment choice in scenario 
1. They would be content in finding the winning active funds even if only a small proportion 
of them actually are winners. However, looking at their responses in scenario 2 it is clear that 
risk averseness is very much dependent on the situation. While they were the least risk averse 
in scenario 1, they were, as a group, very risk averse in scenario 2, which was aimed to 
measure general risk averseness. Lichtenstein, Kaufmann, and Bhagat (1998) hypothesized 
that active fund investors are less risk averse than those who prefer index funds, but this was 
not the case in this sample. So, it seems that their preference for active funds is not due to 
being less risk averse than other investors, as hypothesized by Lichtenstein et al., but more to 
do with their attitudes towards investing in general.   
Table 1. Risk Attitudes of the Interviewees 
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Practically all of the investors showcased significant differences in risk averseness in the two 
situations, which can be partly explained by mental accounting. As a good example, Investor 
C earlier stated that he didn’t deem it worth the hassle to compare fund companies when 
making his 5000 euro investment, which can be interpreted as a willingness to accept high 
levels of risk in the investment. He even stated that the funds he chose were practically the 
riskiest ones available, as he wanted to have the chance to win big. Yet here, when offered the 
chance to earn free money, he would require 500 winnings to take the bet. It is clear that, in 
his 5000 € investment, he could easily lose much more than 100 euros compared to other 
funds by making a poor fund choice. Also, he wouldn’t take the index fund option unless only 
25 percent of active funds beat the benchmark indexes. This cannot be explained by a belief in 
fund picking skills, as he stated that he doesn’t currently have the skills to pick winning funds 
without putting substantial work into it, which he hasn’t done and wouldn’t do other than for 
much larger sums. He even stated that he doesn’t like gambling, which is backed up by the 
results of the coin toss experiment. It seems that he is placing investments in a mental account 
where risk seeking behavior, even wildly so, is acceptable. For him, investments are somehow 
an area where risk is not only required, but something to be purposefully sought after. Yet, the 
fact that he doesn’t really like the gambling aspect of it is borne out in the fact that he stated 
that he hasn’t enjoyed the investment experience.       
 
The small sample and simple analysis provided here suggests that investors have significant 
problems in evaluating the risk-return relationships of their investments. Somehow, small 
potential immediate losses are much more vividly felt by some than more substantial potential 
future losses. Perhaps this is a reflection of the mutual fund investment as a whole being 
ambiguous to retail investors. Most of the investors showed a much greater willingness to 
gamble in investments than with cash, even when the odds were much more on their side in 
the latter.  
 
Investor D provided an interesting counterexample. While he was willing to take the bet in 
scenario 2 with the possibility of 100 Euro winnings, thus showing no risk averseness, he 
required 65% of active funds to beat the market for him to choose active funds over index 
funds if similar index funds were available. For him, retirement money is not something to be 
gambled with, while losing 100 Euros in the moment is just a part of the enjoyment of 
gambling.   
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7. Summary and Main Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide a qualitative study into how private Finnish stock 
mutual fund investors make their decisions, with an emphasis on how they determine whether 
to choose actively or passively managed funds. The objective was to further our 
understanding of how retail investors, Finnish investors in particular, arrive at their 
investment choices. Understanding how decisions are made helps in being able to better 
educate investors on how to choose the investment vehicles that best suit their situation. I 
evaluated which specific fund characteristics affect investor decisions most while also 
including behavioral economics concepts in the analysis. The research was committed by 
interviewing ten Finnish retail stock fund investors by using the semi-structured interview 
method. The interview data was then analyzed to find patterns of behavior or ideas. Also, the 
data was further analyzed by comparing it to the results of past studies on investment 
behavior and behavioral literature.    
 
7.1 Main Conclusions 
As might be expected, the interviews revealed that the mutual fund choice process is 
approached in countless different ways. However, the data suggests that there are certain 
tendencies which apply to many Finnish retail investors. Also, the results differed 
significantly from those of many past studies. 
 
Perhaps the main finding of this study is that the results suggest that many Finnish retail 
investors do not perform any comparisons of fund companies. They often choose their own 
bank as the default option. When they do not choose the bank, they most often choose the first 
company that has contacted them, or the first company whose advertisement caught their eye. 
This is a significant finding, as most often the size of the stock mutual fund investments are 
very significant, varying from two thousand euros to 135 000 euros in this study. It is hard to 
imagine any other purchase of a similar size being made without the buyer doing substantial 
comparisons of the service/product providers. For example, we wouldn’t expect to see 
someone decide to buy a car, simply walk to the nearest car dealership and proceed to buy the 
first car that sort of looks nice. In effect, however, this is what many retail mutual fund 
investors seem to do when making their fund purchases. 
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The fact that the default fund company option is the one most investors choose has significant 
implications. Banks are the default option for many retail investors’ mutual fund investments, 
especially those with relatively small holdings. As banks are probably aware of this trend, 
they are in a position where they can determine fund features that are more favorable to them 
than if they faced sterner competition to attract customers. This partly explains why Finnish 
banks often offer funds with higher fee structures than smaller competitors. Another finding 
of this study, which closely follows from the fact that banks are often the default option, is 
that mutual fund investors through banks are often much less knowledgeable of investment 
options than those who invest through other institutions.             
 
After going along with the default fund company, the main factor in choosing specific funds 
within the company’s options was the geographic location or industry of the stock holdings in 
the fund. Neither the stock holdings nor being the easiest fund company to do business with 
were options in Jäntti’s (2005) or Capon’s et al. (1996) questionnaires. This implies that the 
importance of factors such as past performance could be exaggerated. Thus, the analysis of 
the interview data in this study goes some way to establishing that some of the results from 
past studies on investor’s mutual fund decision making on an individual level are 
questionable. This was made even more explicit after I compared the interview data with the 
answers given by the interviewees to Jäntti’s questionnaire questions. Their answers to Jäntti’s 
questions produced similar results to Jäntti’s study while the analysis of their actual behavior 
described in the interviews produced completely different outcomes. 
 
One of the main differences between the results of this study and prior studies is that the 
results suggest that past returns is not nearly as important a factor for investors in choosing 
mutual funds as has been suggested previously. Previous studies have essentially all agreed 
that past returns is the most important factor in fund choice, while this study suggests that it 
significantly trails the factors described above.  
 
Interview data analyzed here implies that investors are largely indifferent to fund fees. This is 
in line with previous research which suggests that fees do not have a large effect on fund 
flows. However, it differs from Jäntti’s (2005) results which ranked fee structure as the second 
most important decision factor. 
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My findings tend to agree with Capon’s et al. (1996) findings that a significant portion of 
mutual fund investors are ignorant of many central issues regarding their investments. Only 
four of the ten interviewees could describe the fee structure of their funds. Just as alarming 
was the fact that only one of the eight investors in active funds used the proper benchmark to 
judge the performance of their funds. This is in line with Goetzmann’s et al. (1992) 
suggestion that many investors do not know if their investments are performing poorly. 
Without using the right benchmark for comparison it is not possible to effectively evaluate 
performance of a fund and the investor could be either happy with one of the worst 
performers in its category or unhappy with one of the best performers in its category.  
 
If there is a large group of Finnish mutual fund investors who are ignorant on major aspects of 
their fund holdings, they are likely to make poor fund choices. This could be a societal 
problem as it will negatively affect the efficiency of the market. It could be argued that it 
would be beneficial if fund companies and investment advisors were required to more 
explicitly and clearly state the fee structures of funds and how those fees affect the total 
returns of the fund. Likewise, fund companies and investment advisors could be required to 
explain the importance of benchmark indexes to the customer.   
 
When considering Savage’s (1954) modern theory of rational decision making under 
uncertainty, the behavioral analysis in this study showed evidence that the interviewees 
followed less than optimal decision models. There were clear examples of gambling behavior 
and treating investments as entertainment. Biases observed included loss and risk aversion, 
the disposition effect, biases caused by mental accounting, and the status quo bias. The 
analysis provided in this study suggests that investors have significant problems in evaluating 
the risk-return relationships of their investments. Small potential immediate losses are much 
more vividly felt by some investors than more substantial potential future losses. It seems 
clear that behavioral aspects should be, whenever possible, included in any analysis on mutual 
fund decision making.  
 
Finally, the research here suggests that there is a large group of investors who would be 
potential index fund investors if they had a better knowledge of how index funds operate and 
if index funds were more easily available to them. Many of the investors interviewed here 
would be perfectly fine with achieving average market returns, but did not know that there is 
a vehicle which makes it possible to achieve them. Most of them did not believe that active 
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funds on average beat the market. At the same time, they generally doubted their ability to 
pick winners. In all, the results suggest that many investors would make different decisions in 
choosing between active and passive funds if they had more information and thought about 
the issue in more depth. 
 
7.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
The results presented here are clearly not statistically significant, but they make a convincing 
case that the designs of some previous studies on mutual fund decision making, namely those 
of Jäntti (2005) and Capon et al. (1996), are somewhat faulty, which could result in a lack of 
reliability. However, it is not conceivable to reach statistical validity on investor behavior 
through interviews due to the substantial work they require. Interviews also result in such 
enormous amounts of versatile data that quantitative analysis is practically impossible. 
Therefore, I suggest there is a need for further questionnaire studies on fund investor 
behavior. These studies should be carefully designed with a more comprehensive look at the 
mutual fund investment decision so as not to miss out on possible factors, such as those 
described in the previous section, which could have a significant influence on the fund 
investment decision. 
 
Another beneficial topic for further research would be further investigating how well 
investors know the options available to them. As this study and prior research suggest, there is 
a large group of investors without basic knowledge of fund characteristics. While this investor 
ignorance has been studied in the past, the research has not involved whether investors are 
aware of options such as index funds, which might be suitable for them. Thus, there is a need 
for a statistically valid study on whether retail investors truly are unaware of the options 
available to them. Especially so, if society deems it part of its role to help ensure retail 
investors make better investment choices. The results could be used in legislating guidelines 
for fund companies and investment advisors.    
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Appendix 1: Interviewees 
Investor A interview conducted on 7.2.2012 
Investor B interview conducted on 12.2.2012 
Investor C interview conducted on 19.2.2012 
Investor D interview conducted on 22.2.2012 
Investor E interview conducted on 12.3.2012 
Investor F interview conducted on 19.3.2012 
Investor G interview conducted on 18.3.2012 
Investor H interview conducted on 21.3.2012 
Investor J interview conducted on 28.2.2012 
Investor K interview conducted on 16.3.2012 
 
Age distribution: 27, 29, 36, 39, 39, 42, 44, 48, 62, 64 
Gender distribution: 8 male, 2 female 
Yearly salary: 30 000€, 38 000€, 43 600€, 50 000€, 50 000€, 56 400€, 62 000€, 72 000€, 
160 000€, retired 
Investments in total: 5 000€, 7 500€, 9 000€, 12 000€, 15 000€, 20 000€, 24 000€, 50 000€, 
58 000€, 220 000€ 
Investments in stock mutual funds:  2 000€, 5 000€, 5 000€, 7 000€, 7 500€, 9 000€, 
19 000€, 24 000€, 30 000€, 135 000€,  
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Appendix 2: Framework of the Interview 
As the interviews were conducted in Finnish, the framework is presented in Finnish. How the 
framework was used in each interview depended greatly on the answers of the interviewee.  
 
Sijoituspäätös yleisesti 
Kerro yleisesti, miten teit sijoittamispäätöksesi omistamiisi rahastoihin. 
  
Mahdollisia jatkokysymyksiä, mikäli asiat eivät selvinneet vastauksesta edellä kuvattuun 
avoimeen kysymykseen: 
  Oliko helpoin löytää?  
  Myyjä suositteli? 
  Käytitkö sijoitusneuvontaa ja oliko se tärkeässä roolissa? 
  Uskotko, että sijoitusneuvojat antavat osaavaa neuvontaa? 
  Mitkä asiat rahastossa kiinnostivat? 
  Rahaston sijoituskohteiden kotimarkkinat?  
Sijoituskohteiden toimiala? Yritysten koko? Eettisyys? jne.  
Seuraatko rahoitusalan uutisointia ja vaikuttiko se päätökseesi?  
Minkä rahastojen osuuksia omistat? Pankin rahastoja vai muiden 
sijoitusyhtiöiden? 
Mihin tarkoitukseen sijoitat? 
Oliko valinta helppoa? 
 
Mainonta 
Miten mainonta vaikutti päätökseesi? 
 
Kulurakenne 
Mietitkö rahaston kulurakennetta sijoittaessasi? 
 
Tiedätkö mikä rahastojesi kulurakenne on? (Merkintäpalkkio, hallinnointipalkkio, 
lunastuspalkkio) 
 
Tiedätkö, mikä rahastojesi kulurakenne on muihin verrattuna?    
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Vertasitko sijoittaessasi? 
 
Tuottavatko rahastot joilla on korkeampi kulurakenne parempaa tuottoa kuin rahastot 
keskimäärin? 
 
Historiallinen tuotto 
Oliko historiallinen tuotto merkittävässä asemassa päätöksessäsi? 
 
Vertailitko eri rahastojen historiallisia tuottoja? 
 
Voiko rahaston mennyttä arvonkehitystä mielestäsi käyttää hyväksi arvioitaessa tulevaa 
arvonkehitystä? Miten? 
 
Markkinoiden voittaminen 
Tiedätkö mitä ovat passiivinen ja aktiivinen sijoittaminen?  
 
Mitä ovat aktiiviset rahastot ja indeksirahastot? 
 
Voittavatko aktiivisesti hallinnoidut osakerahastot markkinaindeksin keskimäärin?  
 
Kuinka monta prosenttia aktiivisesti hoidetuista rahastoista uskot voittavan 
vertailuindeksinsä? 
 
Oletko tyytyväinen osakerahastoihisi? Miksi/Miksi et? 
  
Kuinka usein seuraat arvonkehitystä? Päivittäin, viikoittain, kuukausittain, harvemmin, en 
ollenkaan? 
 
Mihin vertaat sijoitustasi arvioidessasi sen tuottoa? (esim. osakemarkkinoihin 
kokonaisuutena, indeksiin, säästötiliin, korkorahastoihin) 
 
Tiedätkö miten sijoituksesi on pärjännyt verrattuna vertailuindeksiinsä tai Suomen/Maailman 
osakemarkkinoihin kokonaisuutena?  
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Jos et tiedä, luuletko että se on tuottanut paremmin/huonommin 
kuin vertailuindeksinsä? 
 
Oletko tehnyt päätöksen yrittää voittaa markkinat, eli saavuttaa paremman tuoton kuin 
markkinat keskimäärin? 
 
Riittäisikö sinulle markkinoiden keskimääräinen tuotto? 
 
Myytkö ja ostatko rahastoja aktiivisesti? 
 
Osaatko valita rahastoja, jotka tuottavat paremmin kuin muut rahastot? Jotka voittavat 
vertailuindeksinsä?  
 
Mitkä tekijät johtavat siihen, että osaat tehdä hyvä valintoja? 
 
Teetkö rahastomerkintöjä ja myyntejä sen mukaan, miten markkinat ja itse rahastot 
heilahtelevat? 
 
Minkä verran luulet että vaatisi aikaa tutkia vaihtoehtoja, seurata markkinoita, opiskella asiaa 
jne., jotta voisi sijoittaa hyvin? 
 
 
Riskinotto 
Hypoteettinen tilanne:  
Jos tietäisit, että 50 prosenttia aktiivisesti hoidetuista rahastoista 
voittaa indeksirahaston, valitsisitko aktiivisesti hoidetun rahaston? 
Jos se olisikin 60 prosenttia? 80 prosenttia? 40 prosenttia? 20 
prosenttia? Onko sillä edes merkitystä, vai uskotko joka 
tapauksessa valitsevasi rahaston, joka tuottaa paremmin kuin 
markkinat keskimääräisesti?  
 
Ottaisitko vastaan seuraavan vedon?  
Valitse kruuna tai klaava. Heitän lanttia. Jos arvasit tuloksen 
oikein, voitat 100 euroa, jos arvasit väärin, häviät 100 euroa.  
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Entä, jos mahdollinen voitto olisi 120 euroa, mutta tappio 100 
euroa?  
 
Montako euroa sinun tulisi voittaa, jotta ottaisit vastaan vedon 
mahdollisen tappion ollessa 100 euroa?  
 
Pidätkö uhkapeleistä? 
 
Passiivinen sijoittaminen 
Oletko harkinnut passiivista eli indeksisijoittamista? 
tai 
Miksi sijoitat indeksirahastoihin? 
 
Miksi et ole harkinnut? 
 
Kiinnostaisiko sinua jatkossa sijoittaa indeksirahastoihin? 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire Questions 
The following questionnaire questions are the same as the two main ones used in Jäntti’s 
(2006) study. The corresponding questions in Jäntti’s study are questions 13 and 18. 
1. Miten arvioisitte seuraavien tekijöiden tärkeyttä valitessanne sijoitusrahastoa? 
Ympyröikää jokaisen tekijän kohdalla Teidän näkemystänne parhaiten vastaava vaihtoehto. 
1. Rahaston historiallinen tuotto   1  2  3  4  5 
2. Salkunhoitajan maine   1  2  3  4  5 
3. Sijoitusneuvojan asiantuntemus   1  2  3  4  5 
4. Rahaston perimät palkkiot   1  2  3  4  5 
5. Rahaston näkyvä mainonta   1  2  3  4  5 
6. Rahastoyhtiön tarjoamien rahastojen runsas määrä 1  2  3  4  5 
7. Rahaston yhteiskuntaystävällisyys  1  2  3  4  5 
8. Rahaston maine    1  2  3  4  5 
9. Puolueettomat rahastovertailut (Morningstar/Eufex) 1  2  3  4  5 
10. Muu, mikä_________________________________ 1  2  3  4  5  
 
1 Ei lainkaan tärkeä 
2 Ei kovin tärkeä 
3 Ei tärkeä eikä merkityksetön  
4 Melko tärkeä 
5 Erittäin tärkeä 
 
 
2. Mikä on tärkein valintakriteeri, kun valitsette sijoitusrahastoa? 
Merkitse viivoille tärkein numerolla yksi (1.) toiseksi tärkein numerolla kaksi (2.) 
kolmanneksi tärkein numerolla kolme (3.) neljänneksi tärkein numerolla neljä (4.) ja 
viidenneksi tärkein numerolla viisi (5.). 
Rahaston perimät palkkiot___________ 
Rahaston historiallinen tuotto___________ 
Rahaston tarjoamat palvelut___________ 
Rahaston mainonta___________ 
Rahaston menestyminen puolueettomissa vertailuissa (esim. Morningstar)__________ 
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